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November 1, 19.78
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JUSTICE POWELL
Subject:

A-417, Rogers v. Lodge
(Application tor Stay Pending CA Appeal}
Federal/Civil

Immediate Situation: Applicants, representing Burke
County, Ga., seek a stay pending appeal to CA 5 of the
order of USDC (SD Ga.) (Alaimo) directing that a special
election be held on November 7, 1978, to fill singledistrict seats on the county ?oard of Elections, under a
plan adopted by the DC after it found that the existing
at-large system unconstitutionally diluted the voting
strength of black voters. The DC and CA 5 (order,
Thornberry, Godbold, Rubin) denied stays.
Facts and DC Decision: The county has elected its
commissioners at large since 1911; there is no claim that
this system was created with discriminatory purpose but
the DC found it was being maintained for tnat purpose.
The
five commissioners are elected together every four tY~ars,
and run for specified numbered positions. No black h~s
ever been elected, although historically the county has
had more blacks than whites,
Respondents, all black
citizens ot the county, challenged the use of numbered
positions (which was begun in 1964 pursuant to general
state law), majority vote, run-offs, and election at large.
The DC found that the present system violated the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, relying primarily on
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA 5), aff'd sub nom
East Carroll Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424""""'U:"S-:---636
(1976). Applying Zimmer's multifactor circumstantial
evidence test, the DC found the following ''primary" factors:
a history of past discrimination; unresponsiveness of elected
officials; depressed socio-economic status of blacks; lack
of black access to the political process; and neutral state
policy towards at-large election.
The following factors
enhanced the dilution: the large size of the county; the
requirement of election by majority vote and election to
specific positions; and the lack of a residency requirement.
The satisfaction of these criteria raise an inference
of discriminatory intent.

I

The DC adopted the plan submitted by the respondents, cut short
the four-year terms to which the present commissioners had been
elected in 1976, and directed the special election.
The DC denied a stay because there was ample time for the
county to overcome any administrative problems; the plan selected
tracks the district lines of an existing militia district; and
further denial or postponement of the rights of black
citizens is not justified.
Applicants' Contentions: Applicants intend to raise on appeal
at least the following issues: whether the doctrine of dilution
applies to districting plans of county and municipal bodies;
whether the requirement of discriminatory intent was satisfied;
whether there is such a requirement; whether the DC should have
afforded local officials an opportunity to devise their own
plan; and whether the plan adopted dilutes white voting strength.
Discussion: This case appears to present the issues before
the Court in Williams v. Brown, No. 78-357, probable jurisdiction
noted October 30, 1978, and City of Mobile v. Bolden, No. 77-1844,
noted October 2, 1978.
It also presents the issue noted in Justice
Rehnquist's ~~diiiag opinion in Wise v. Lipscomb, No. 77-529,
decided June 22, 1978, in which you, the Chief Justice, and Justice
Stewart joined. These facts would seem to justify a stay, although
you might want to refer the application to Friday's Conference,
particularly because we have not yet received a response.
I recommend that you refer this to Friday's Conference.
There is no response; however, respondents have told the Clerk's
office that they will try to mail their response today, by express
mail, for delivery tomorrow.
The DC opinion and the CA order are in the application.
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Marc Richman

..

.
'

November 3, 1978 Conference.,....
Second Supplemental List ~ ·
No. A-417

"~~ _
~

.'_ -~· 1- _
""d~t '
·
~ ~

~ ~ ~~cation

~ ~t J-.,;....,
(represent ln~ B urk ~
~

ROGERS
County, Ga. ~

7~

r

~

for Stay Pending
-Appeal to CA 5, Presented to
Justice Powell and by him
Referred to the Court

~~~'r"',

v.

LODGE (and all black
citizens of county)
SUMMARY:
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~
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Applicants s e ek
stay pending appeal to CA 5

c~ecial

of the order of

·. . .

election be held on November 7, 1978, to fill single-district
seats on the

~ounty

Board of Commissioners, unde! a plan adopted

by the DC after finding that the existing at-large system unconstitutionally

di~uted

the voting strength of black voters.

The DC

and CA 5 (order, Thornberry, Godbold, Rubin) denied stays.
FACTS: - The county has had an at-large system since

191~

There are five ·-commissioners, who are elected together every four
years.

Each candidate runs for a specified numbered position, and

a majority vote is requireft

~or ~lection;

these requirements were

I

/
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(

added in 1964, pursuant to a general state statute.
reside anywhere in the county.

Candidates may

No black has ever been elected,

although historically blacks have been in the majority (ranging from

-

78% in 1930 to 58% in 1975).

ofl-,.,

~

Resps brought this suit in April, 1976; _the bench trial ranA
from June to September 1978.

On September 29, the DC held that the

present commissioners had been unconstitutionally elected in 1976;
adopted the districting plan proposed by resps; and ordered that a
special election be held at the general election scheduled for six
weeks hence.

On October 26, the DC issued its findings and conclu-

sions.
DC DECISION:

The DC found that the at-large system violated

the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, relying primarily on
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (CA 5), aff'd sub nom East Carroll
Parish School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).

Although the

existing scheme of electing county commissioners was racially neutral
when adopted, it was being maintained for invidious purposes.

This

the DC inferred from application of Zimmer's multi-factor circumstantial evidence test.

The DC found the following "primary" factors:

a history of past discrimination; unresponsiveness of elected
officials; - depressed socio-economic status

o~

blacks; lack of black

access to the political process; and neutral state policy towards
at-large election.

The following factors enhanced the dilution:

the

large size of the county; the requirementsof election by majority
vote and election to specific positions; and the lack of a residency
requirement·;

-

The DC ad<;pted the
held

"superior~'

to

~tricting

that:_ - o-~

plan submitted by resps; it was

-ap_2licants because the population deviation

- 3 --

between districts was substantially less.
The DC denied a stay because there was ample time for the
county to overcome any administrative problems (the plan tracked the
district lines of an existing militia-district) and because further
denial of postponement of the rights of black_ citizens was not
justified.
APPLICANTS

CONTENTIONS:

Applicants intend to raise on appeal

at least the following issues ~hether the ~octrine of di~on
applies to distrjlcting plans of county and municipal bodies; . whether
the requiremen; of

~~riminat:ry

satisfie~hether

intent was

the

DC should have afforded local officials an opportunity to devise
their own plan; whether the DC should have rejected the remedial
plan submitted by applicants without having first found it to be
invalid;

and whether the plan adopted dilutes white voting strength.

As grounds for a stay, applicants assert the substantial
likelihood of success on appeal (or on cert).

Implementation of

this plan pending appeal will cause the county and its citizens
irreparable harm because the newly elected commissioners will answer
to a
lo4oq

s~a!l,
..-

single district constituency, and may even direct that

........--._. , _ _

---

---

the appeal be dismissed.
...

-~

-

,._,

,...,

...............

Resps can -show no

irrepa~able

injury,

~

because at- most the system in existence for 67 years will remain, with
blacks free to vote without hindrance and with the ability to control
the outcome (if the appeals
DISCUSSION:

~ast

beyond 1980).

This case appears to present the issues presently

before the Court in Williams v. Brown, No. 78-357, probable jurisdic_tion noted October 30, 1978, and City of Mobile v. Bolden, No. 77-1844,
noted October 2, 1978, and

the issue noted in Justice Rehnquist's

- 4 separate opinion in Wise v. Lipscomb, No. 77-529, decided June 22,
1978.

These facts would seem to justify a stay.

However, the

Court probably should wait for the response, which was mailed from
Georgia at 10 p.m. on November 1 (by express mail), possibly even
if it means waiting until Monday, November 6-*/
A response is in the mail.
11/2/78

Richman

PJC

DC order and Op
and CA order in
applic.

*/It would lead to chaos if the Court granted a stay Friday, and then
nad to vacate it Monday, after consideration of the response; it
would be better _to delay the decision initially to avoid that ~ isk .
.:-*
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November 6, 1978
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONFERENCE
Subject:

Rogers v. Lodge, A-417

On Friday, the Court stayed the election which the DC had
ordered to be held tomorrow. November 3, 1978 Conference, p. 15a.
The response to the application has now been received.
Respondents argue primarily that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the finding .of dilution; that the remedy was not too
drastic and was well within the DC's powers; and that there is
accordingly little chance of reversal on appeal. Respondents also
argue that the evidence showed statutory violations, but the DC
did not address those claims in view of its constitutional holding.
As mitigating against a stay, respondents point out that the election
campaign has been completea and that the candidates have spent
a considerable amount of time and money.
Nothing in the . ~esponse
the Court acted on Friday.

changes the premises upon which

A copy o;£; the response ;ls attached.
Marc Richman

Note: A reply to the ~esponse was just received. It responds to · severa:
fact statements in the response, but has little else to add.
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IN THE

\l

\~ 0' 1
OFflCE pF THE CLE~5
SUPRE E COURT,

~

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

i

I
U.::J

OCTOBER TERM 1978

QUENT IN ROGERS, RAY DELAIGLE, ROBERT L.
\v m STER, CHARLES H. KITCHENS , AND
TtfOMAS M. LOVETT, AS MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA,
AND A. HOLLAND GNANN, OTTO B. JOHNSON AND
WALL T. THOMPSON, AS MEMBERS OF THE
BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA
APPLICANTS
VS:
LODGE, SHELLEY COLEMAN, LIZZIE M. SAMS,
K. C. CHILDERS, REV. DAVID NELSON, TALMADGE
D. LODGE, WOODROW HARVEY AND LEVI CRANFORD

HERMA~

RESPONDENTS

APPLICATION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL OF AN ORDER
OF THE UNITED STATED DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ORDERING A SPECIAL
ELECTION OF ALL FIVE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS OF BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA,
ON NOVEMBER 7, 1978

( tc:·2. ~
4- I Uf.J""() - (fK h l~t(/'
P. 0. Box 88
Waynesboro, Georgia 30830
Tel: 912/554-3955

tJ'f

P. 0. Box 896
Elberton, Georgia 30635
Tel: 404/283-2651

PRESTON B. LEWIS
LEWIS & LEWIS

E. FREEMAN LEVERETT
HEARD, LEVERETT & ADAMS
ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANTS

I

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

QUENTIN ROGERS,

et al

Applicants

NO. ____________________

VS:
HERMAN LODGE, et al

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

Respondents

A'l?PLIC,"\TION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL OF AN ORDER
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA, ORDERING A SPECIAL
ELECTION OF ALL FIVE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
CO~iiSSIONERS OF BURKE COUNTY, GEORGIA
ON NOVEMBER 7, 1978
TO THE HONORABLE LEWIS F. POWELL, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Come now Applicants, defendants in the District Court
below, and pursuant to Rule 51 of the Rules of this Court, move
for a st.ay pending appeal of the final judgment and injunction
issued by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia, Augusta Division, on September 29, 1978,
declaring unconstitutional an Act of the General Assembly of
Georgia (Ga. Laws 1911, p. 380) providing for the election atlarge of the five (5) members of the Board of Commissioners
of Burke County, Georgia, ordering the terms of the five incumbents elected for four (4) year terms in 1976 to be cut in
half, and ordering that a special election be held on November 7,
1978, to elect successors for the incumbent commissioners, to
take office on January 1, 1979, and by way of grounds therefor,
show as follows:

1.
Un~ess

stayed, the order as entered by the Court below

will be effectuated at the November General Election to be
held on November 7, 1978, within less than one week, and therefore t i me is of the essence.

Consequently, the Court should act

immediately to grant the stay.
2.

App l ication for stay was made to the district court
and denie d on October 10, 1978.

Application to the Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was denied on October 26, 1978,
and received by applicants on October 29, 1978.
3.

The effect of the injunction entered below is to strike
down an election system which has been in effect in Burke County,
Georgia for 67 years, and which the district court below found
was racially neutral when adopted (Findings, p. 7).

The basis

of the Court's '. decision was that the county-wide or at-large
voting system in Burke County unconstitutionally diluted the
strength of black votes, within the meaning of a number of decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, beginning with Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (C.A.
5th 1973), aff'd sub nom Eas·t · Carroll' Parish School Board v.
Marshall, 424

u.s.

636 (1976), "but without approval of the

constitutional views expressed by the Court of Appeals" (424

u.s.

at 638).
4.

By way of relief, the district court, without a
hearing thereon, ordered into effect a plan submitted by plaintiffs which purports to divide Burke County into five districts

-2-
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of equal population, but deliberately gerrymandered so as
(1)

Create two districts containing 74.9 and 77.6% black popula-

tion, designed to insure election of 2 black candidates~
(2) Place three (3) 1 of the present white incumbents in the
largest black district (Dist. No. 1, 77.6% black - see Findings,
p. 28), so as to dilute the white voting strength, while
( 3)

Carefully placing two of the black plaintiffs in the t ·wo

separate, overwhelmingly black districts to avoid their having
to run against each other.

The two plaintiffs, Messrs. Herman

Lodge and Woodrow Harvey, have qualified to run from the two
overwhelmingly black districts, Harvey in District 1, and Lodge
in Distr i ct 2.

Consequently,

rather than remedying racial

voting dilution , the Court's order below has mandated it in . an
egregious· ·, ~·orm .

1. The deliberate, intentional election rigging purpose of
plaintiffs' plan, adopted by the district court below, is
graphically demonstrated by events transpiring below in
connection with submissions of the plaintiffs' plans. As
originally filed, the Complaint erroneously named "Raymond
DeLaigle" as one of the 5 Conunissioners. Raymond DeLaigle was
not a Commissioner,: but was a retired clerk of the Superior
Court \-lho lives on the West side of Ga. Highway 56. The
proper defendant should-niVe been "Ray DeLaigle", who lives
just across the road from Raymond DeLaigle on the East side of
Ga. Highway 56. At an early stage in the proceedings, the
district judge below directed the parties to submit proposed
plans for use in the event the Court should rule for plaintiffs.
The plan then submitted by plaintiffs, and finally adopted by the
Court below, included three white incumbents in District 1
(77.6% black), and the same "Raymond DeLaigle", erroneously
named as a defendant Commissioner, who lives on the west side of
Georgia Highway 56. At the conclusion of the trial on September
12, 1978, the district court directed the parties to submit plans.
This time, having discovered that the proper defendant was "Ray
DeLaigle" and not "Raymond DeLaigle", plaintiffs submitted a
modification of their plan which differed only slightly by shifting the line from Highway 56 to a point just east of State
Highway 56, for the purpose of including Ray DeLaigle in Distric
1, thereby placing 4 of the 5 white incumbents in the same district. Shortly after announcing his order, the district judge
left on vacation, and counsel for defendants were advised by the
district judge's law clerk that the judge had made an error in
ordering defendants to use the original plan, but really intended to order in effect the revised plan which placed 4 incumbents
in the same district.
-3-

5.

This case was instituted on April 5, 1976, by Herman
Lodge, and seven (7) other black citizens of Burke County,
Georgia, against the five individuals constituting the Board of
Commissioners of Burke County, as well as the probate judge of
said County, 2 and was brought under 42 USCA 1983, attacking the
county-wide method of electing the five members of the Board
of Commiss ion<>r s, the governing authority of Burke County,
Georgia, as being an unconstitutional dilution of black voting
power in said county.
6.

The trial commenced in Augusta, Georgia, on June 22,
1978, and after several recesses, was finally concluded in
Brunswick, Georgia, on September 12, 1978.
7.

On September 29, 1978, the district court entered
order holding that plaintiffs were entitled to recover, and
ordering that a special election be held at the same time as
the General Election for Governor and

u. s.

Congressmen on

November 7, 1978, at which time successors to the five (5)
incumbent members of the Board of Commissioners would be elected
to take office in January, 1979, and serve for a two year term
until their successors are elected at the general election to
be held in November, 1980, when elections for Commissioners are
regularly scheduled by law. As the incumbent commissioners were
all elected in 1976 to serve four (4) year terms, the effect of

2. By order entered July 28, 1976, theCourt dropped Mrs. Mary
Herrington, probate judge of Burke County as a party defendant,
and substituted in her place the three (3) members of the
recently created Board of Elections (Ga. Laws 1975, Vol. II,
p. 4506), which assumed the duties of holding elections previously exercised by the probate judge.

-4-

the order was to cut these four (4) year terms in half, and
order that a special election be held within the short period
of approximately five (5) weeks.

The order also recites that

findings of fact and conclusions of law had not then been
prepared, but would be filed later.

A copy of said order is

attached hereto, marked "Exhibit A" and by reference is made a
part hereof.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were later

entered on October 26, 1978, and a copy is attached hereto as
"Exhibit B".
8.

The order further provides that Burke County will be
divided into five (5) districts, with one member to be elected
from each dist r i ct by the qualified voters thereof, according
to a plan submitted by plaintiffs as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 300.
In so doing, the district court adopted a plan submitted by
plaintiffs in lieu of plans submitted by defendants without
having first found and declared such latter plans to be invalid
or insufficient in law, contrary to the ruling in Wise v.
Lipscomb,

_ _u.s. ___ ,

57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978).
9.

Notice of appeal was filed below on October 2,
1978, and an amended notice was filed on or about October 11,
1978.
10.
The plan struck down by the district court was one
which had been in effect in Burke County for 67 years, having
been enacted in 1911 (Ga. Laws 1911, p. 380). 3
3. In 1929, the Act was amended to provide for appointment
of the 5 commissioners by the grand jury in 1932 {Ga. Laws
1929, p. 548), but before the Act was ever put into effect,
it was again amended in 1931 so as to revert back to election
by the people (Ga. Laws 1931, p. 400).

-5-

11.
The evidence without dispute shows that the Act of
1911 (Ga. Laws 1911, p. 380) was enacted without any purpose
to discriminate on the basis of race.

The district court below

held that the present scheme was racially neutral when
adopted (Findings, p. 7).
12.
The decision of the district court in this case
therefore strikes down a law and election plan in effect for 67
years without the showing of intentional discrimination held
requisite in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Dayton
Board of Education v. Brinkman, 53 L.Ed.2d 851, 859 (1977);
.

.

Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Metropolitan School District v.
Buckley, 429

u.s.

1068 (1977); Austin Indep. School District

v. United States, 429

u.s.

School District No. 1, 413

990 (1976); and compare Keyes v.

u.s.

189, 208 (1973); and is there-

fore error.
13.
In striking down the 67 year old Burke County election
plan in this case which the district court admitted was not
enacted for a discriminatory purpose, the Court below purported
to follow a line of decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which began with Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F2d 1297 (C.A. 5th 1973), aff'd sub nom ("but
without approval of the constitutional views expressed by the
Court of Appeals"), and which was decided before this Court's
decision in Washington v. Davis, supra, decided in 1976.

Zimmer

v. McKeithen was- decided under the now discarded discriminatory

-6-

"impact" or "effect" test, for in that case, the Court stated
the test to be "that designedly or otherwise, an apportionment
scheme, under the circumstances of a particular case, would
operat~

to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial

or political elements of the voting population.
at 1304 (emphasis supplied).

" 485 F2d

In order to apply this "effect"

or "impact" standard the Court articulated a list of 4 considerat:ion s whi ch have come to be known as the "Zimmer criteria",
and four enhancing factors, . viz.
"* * * where a minority can demonstrate a

lack of access to the process of slating
candidates, the unresponsiveness of legislators to their particularized interests,
a tenuous state policy underlying the preference for multi-member or at-large
districting, or that the existence of
past discrimination in general precludes
the effective participation in the election
system, a strong case is made.

Such proof

is enhanced by a showing of the existence
of large districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot voting provisions
and the lack of provision for at-large
candidates running from particular geographical subdistricts.

The fact of dilu-

tion is established upon proof of the
existence of an aggregate of these factors.
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncement
in White v. Regester, supra, demonstrates,
however, that all these factors need not
be proved in order to obtain relief."
(485 F2d at 1305).

-7-
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13.
This same "discriminatory impact" approach has been
applied unremittingly in a number of subsequent decisions.
Paige v. Gray, 538 F2d 1108 (C.A. 5th 1976); Wallace v. House,
538 F2d 1138 (C.A. 5th 1976); Parnell v. Rapides Parish School
Board, 563 F2d 180 (C.A. 5th 1977); Kirksey v. Board cf Supervisors, 554 F2d 139 (C.A. 5th 1977), cert. den . 54 L.Ed.2d 454
(1977); David v. Garrison, 553 F2d 923 (C.A. 5th 1977); Nevett
v. Sides, 533 F2d 1361 (C.A. 5th 1976); United States v.
Supervisors of Forrest County, Mississippi, 571 F2d 951 (C.A.
5th 1978); Neve tt v. Sides, 571 F2d 209 (C.A. 5th 1978); Bolden
v. City o f Mobi l e, 571 F2d 238 (C.A. 5th 1978); Blacks United
v. Shrevepor t, 571 F2d 248 (C.A. 5th 1978); and Thomasville
Branch, NAACP v . Thomas County, 571 F2d 257 (C.A. 5th 1978).
In Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, supra, the en bane Court
held that racially gerrymandered districting was mandated in
plans designed as a remedy for existing election schemes
found to be unconstitutional under the dilution doctrine (554
F2d at 151).
14.
In four decisions decided March 29, 1978, a panel
of the Court of Appeals took note of this Court's holdings
that under the Fourteenth Amendment, a case of intentional
discrimination must be shown, and held that whether considered
under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, intentional discrimination must also be shown in order to establish a case of
unconstitutional dilution.

Nevett v. Sides, 571 F2d 209, 217-

221 (C.A. 5th 1978); Bolden v. City of Mobile, supra; Blacks
United v. City of Shreveport, supra; Thomasville Branch, NAACP
v. Thomas County,

supra~

~~ , ~~

that in the Mobile

and Thomas County, Georgia, cases, the at-large plan had not
been enacted for a racially discriminatory purpose, the Court
nevertheless held that a case of dilution could be established

-8-

on a showing that the at-large plan had been maintained for such
a purpose, and that the Zimmer criteria had survived Washington
v. Davis as being a means of determining whether the at-large
plan was being maintained for a discriminatory purpose:

"Whether

the pla.n is recent or remote, the Zinuner criteria provide a
factual basis from which the necessary intent may be inferred."
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F2d at 223.

The net effect of this exercise

in semantics therefore was that despite the "discriminatory
impact" basis of the Zimmer criteria, the Court of Appeals has
held that they have survived the intentional discrimination
rationale of

~~s hington

v. Davis, and that really Washington v.

Davis has not c hanged anything.

In this case, the district judge

observed that "Functionally, this added requirement has not
changed the district court's task since 'a finding of racially
discriminatory dilution under the Zimmer criteria raises an
inference of intent and, therefore. • • a finding under the
criteria satisfies the intent requirement • • • '" (Findings,
pp. 4-5).
15.
The decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
in dilution cases, followed by the district court below,
therefore arecontrary to Washington v. Davis, supra, and the
other cases cited above in paragraph 12.
16.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the district
court below by applying the Zimmer criteria, the evidence below
without dispute shows that the at-large system had not been
maintained for a discriminatory purpose.

What the evidence

does show is that in fact the question of county-wide versus
district voting has never been an issue or even discussed in
Burke County prior to the filing of this case in 1976.

Conse-

quently, there is direct evidence that the county-wide system
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was not maintained for a discriminatory purpose, and therefore,
the so-·called Zimmer criteria (485 F2d 1297) , a species of circumstantial evidence giving rise to an inference that countywide voting was being maintained for discriminatory purposes,
could have no application whatever to this case.
17.
The recent action of this Court on October 2, 1978,
in noting probable jurisdiction in City of Mobile, Alabama v.
Bolden,_ No. I 7- 1844 (S.C., 571 F2d 238), 47 U. S. Law Week
3221, furth e r i ndicates the unsettled and evolving nature of the
law in this a r ea, for some of the questions presented for
decision in that case are whether the decisions of't.l"e'Court:o:e.JlPpe.al
in this area are in conflict with principles established in
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), Washington v. Davis,
426

u.s.

229 (1976), and other cases, and whether the Constitu-

tion authorizes a federal court to legislate an entirely new
form of government for a city "for no purpose except that of
guaranteeing that black citizens • • • will be elected to city
offices."

47

u.s.

Law Week 3190-1.
18.

According to the Census of 1970, the population of
Burke County is 18,255, of which 10,988, or 60.19% are black.
Blacks constitute 53.56% of the voting age population, and 38%
of the registered voters.

Since the evidence shows without

dispute that blacks have had no difficulty registering or voting
in Burke County, black citizens presently have it within their
power to control elections on a county-wide basis.
19.
Because there is direct proof that county-wide voting
was not originally instituted for a discriminatory purpose, and
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that it has not been maintained for such a purpose, defendants
show t't:.at the Zimmer criteria (485 F2d 1297, 1305) are not applicable bere.

However, even conceding the applicability of the

Zimmer criteria to the facts of this case, the undisputed evidence is that two of the factors do not exist at all. To begin
with, county-wide voting in Burke County is rooted in a strong
state policy divorced from discrimination, having been in effect
in Burke County for 67 years, and in effect in at least eleven
elective bodies in adjoining or nearby counties. 5 The district
court below r Pcognized that this Zimmer issue was neutral
(Findings, pp . 21-2).
20.
The evidence also requires the finding that blacks
have equal access to the slating of candidates.

The evidence

shows that there is no formal slating of candidates in Burke
County, and no powerful organizations or individuals through
whom candidacies are customarily cleared.

In order to run, .a

person merely goes to party officials and pays the entrance
fee.

Black candidates have run, and have had no difficulty

doing so.

Also, the evidence showed that the blacks are better

organized politically than the whites, in that there are two
black organizations which conduct political meetings at which

5. Jefferson County, Ga. Laws 1935, p. 713; Columbia County,
Ga. Laws 1968, Vol. I, p. 2338 (county-wide voting for commissioners running from districts); Taliaferro County, Ga. Laws
1877, p. 269; Warren County, Ga. Laws 1877, p. 269; Lincoln
County Board of Education, Ga. Laws 1953 Nov. Dec. Sess.,
p. 219; Lincoln County Commissioners, Ga. Laws 1949, pp.
1228, 1230; Elbert County Commissioners, Ga. Laws 1962,
Vol. II, p. 2319; Elbert County Board of Education, Ga. Laws
1958 Vol. I, p. 717; McDuffie County Commissioners, Ga. Laws
1964, Vol. 2, p. 2095; Oglethorpe County, Commissioners, Ga.
Laws 1872, p. 453; Oglethorpe County, Board of Education, Ga.
Laws 1966 Vol. I, p. 764. Also, of the fifty largest school
boards in the United States, thirty-two use city-wide elections. See Black Voters v. McDonough, 565 F2d 1, 2 (C.A. 1st
1977).
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candidates a:re invited to attend and speak , and at laas t one
of these organizations publishes a ticket of approved candidates
which is circulated at the polls.

The findings of the district

court below, while conceding that blacks have not been discrimi-.
nated a gainst with respect to voting or running for office
(F indin~rs , p. 19) ,

attarpt.s to gloss over this fact, by embarking

upon an inquiry which confuses this issue with the entirely
separate

~mer

factor relating to whether "past discrimination

in general pr e cl udes the effective participation in the election
system.

" (485 F2d at 1305).

In other words, in order to

support i ts finding, the Court below confuses analysis by
holding that a finding on
another factor.

~

Zimmer criteria also establishes

See Findings, .pp. 19-21. 6
21.

Third, the overwhelming weight of the evidence shoWs
that Burke County officials have been responsive to the particularized needs of blacks.

Contrary to the finding below

(p. 12), the evidence shows that blacks have been appointed
to the Jury Collll\issioners, Board of Education, Voters Registration Board, Waynesboro-Burke County Recreation Commission,
Department of Family and Children Services Board, Central
Savannah River Area Board, and one black has been elected to
the City Council in Waynesboro.

With respect to road paving,

the district court's findings disregard the undisputed evidence

6. The emphasis placed by the Court below upon the role of the
local Democratic Executive Committee is puzzling. The undisputed
evidence below was to the effect that the Committee had little
or nothing to do, most of the members had never attended a
meeting, that anyone was free to run for the positions, widespread public announcement of which was made before each primary, and there was no evidence whatever that the Committee had
ever made a substituted nomination. As one member of the Committee testified, it functioned mainly in the past to conduct the
primary election, and after that function was taken over in
Georgia by the probate court and in Burke County by t he Election
Board, the local committee now has little or nothing to do.
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that there are 640 miles of unpaved roads in Burke County:
defendants identified 14 unpaved roads on which the majority
of citizens a re white, and with respect to the 20 unpaved
roads pointed out by plaintiffs as being inhabitated mainly
by blacks, de f endants showed that a number of them were not
paved by the county commissioners at all, but by state authorities as part of a patronage system for local citizens who
had supported successful state-wide candidates.

The reference

to the Commissioners donating public funds to buy band uniforms
for the private, all-white school (Findings, p. 15) is incorrect.
The Commissioners once contributed funds to purchase band uniforms for the public schools, but on a later occasion declined
to do so again on advice of the county attorney.

The Court's

finding below that 3 additional registration sites provided
by the commissioners were not added until after "friendly
persuasion" by the Court at a pretrial conference (Findings,
p. 14), is not correct.

These sites were approved on February

10, 1976 (D.Exh. 4), and the present case was not even filed
until April 5, 1976, and it was several months thereafter before
any pretrial hearing was held before the Court, probably after
the election had been held.

The Court's reference to the fact

that there are 2 schools in the county that are still segregated
(Findings, p. 9), also neglects to explain that this is because
of an order entered by this same federal court for the Southern
District of Georgia, (D. Exh. 55), permitting students who are
in the minority to transfer to another school in the system where
they a r e also in the minority.

The two schools in question were

small, isolated schools located in predominantly black areas,
and although the public schools in Burke County were ooly 28.8% whit
before any desegregation took place, the white percentage was
reduced to only 19% during desegregation and has now increased
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•.

to 22%, meaning that there has been less resistance to school
desegregation in Burke County than in Washington, D.
New Jersey, and any other Northern cities.

c., Newark,

Moreover, ·Applicants

submit that there is no basis in the Constitution for a federal
court to adjudicate constitutional issues on the basis of whether
or not , in its opinion, the governing body of a political subdivision of a state has been responsive to the particularized
interests~fany

segment of the population.

In this case, there

was launched an investigation into every resolution or other
action taken hy the governing body of Burke County during the
last 2 5 year ·"' .

Such an inquiry places the federal courts in

the position of rewarding or punishing political subdivisions

of

a state depending upon whether or not the federal court approves
or disapproves of the political philosophies of the governing
bodies of those subdivisions as reflected by their legislative
enactments.

These are political questions, pure and simple,

for which judicially-manageable standards simply do not exist.
22.
The finding of the Court below that there is a history
of past discrimination in Burke County (Findings, pp. 6-11)
misses the point.

Certainly, there has been discrimination in

Burke County in the past with respect to school segregation,
as well as segregation in other areas.

However, this case

deals with voting, and there is no evidence whatever that during
the last 30 years, there has been any discrimination either in
registering or voting by blacks in Burke County.

Every plaintiff

and every plaintiffs' witness who testified, testified that
they had always been able to register and vote without difficulty.
While a literacy test was enforced until passage of the Voting
Rights Act, that test was constitutional, Lassiter v. Northam to
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•,

Electi~n

Board, 360

u.s.

45, 51-2 (1960), and the undisputed

testimony in this case is that very few, if any, blacks were
ever denied registration in Burke County because of their
inability to successfully complete this test.

To the contrary,

the undisputed testimony was that blacks had been treated
fairly in t he r egistration process.

The Court's finding that

the sudden increase in registration following enactment of
the Voting Rights Act is merely a conclusion without any facts
to support it.

To begin with, the 41.8% black registration is

incorrect, and plaintiffs and defendants both agreed that this
figure, although included in discovery documents but never admitted in evidence, was based upon errors in tabulation.

The

segregated laundromat referred to by the Court (Findings,

•

p. 11), was an isolated instance which was not even known to
any of the defendants until this trial.

More to the point,

however, there was no evidence whatever that the past segregation in education or in other facilities, operated in the least
during the present to prevent blacks from voting or registering
to vote, and that, and not segregated schools or other facilities,
is the touchstone of this litigation.
23.
Defendants further show that the doctrine of dilution
relied on in this case has no applicability to the districting
plans of county and municipally elected bodies.

Wise v. Li scomb,

57 L.Ed.2d 411, 423 (1978) (concurring opinion of 4 justicies).
24.
The decision of the Court below is also erroneous as a
matter of law in that in the unnecessary haste to reach a
decision before the 1978 November election, the district court
rendered final judgment before first making the detailed findings
of fact and conclusions of law required by the decisions of the ·
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Court of Appeals.

Nevett v. Sides, 533 F2d 1361 (C.A. 5th 1976);

David v.

553 F2d 923 (C.A. 5th 1977); Blacks United

Garriso~,

For Lasting Leadership v. Shreveport, 571 F2d 248 (C.A. 5th
1978).
25.
The Court's order below also is erroneous for the ·
reason that a districting plan can no longer be held invalid
~imply

because of a history of past discrimination.

McGill

Gadsden County Commission, 535 F2d 277 (C.A. 5th 1976),

v.

dis~

approving a contrary holding in Wallace v. House, 515 F2d 619
(C.A. 5th 1975), vacated and remanded 425

u.s.

947 (1976).

Even

so, in this case the evidence of past discrimination related to
such things as segregated schools, and not discrimination in the
denial of voting or registering.
26.
The Court's order below is erroneous for the reason
that it violates the principle that the Court should not mandate
a court-ordered plan without first affording local officials
an opportunity to devise their own plan, Wise v. Lipscomb, supra,
and submit it under Section 5.

Berry v. Doles,

U.S.

57 L.Ed.2d 693 (1978).
27.
Applicants show that because there is a delay of
over a year in getting transcripts typed up in the Southern
District of Georgia, and a delay of 1 to2 years in deciding
cases in the Fifth Circuit, it is impossible for the case to
reach this Court until after the persons elected in November
take office, and doubtful that the case can even reach this
Court until after the regularly scheduled elections in 1980
take place.

The end effect may therefore be that the case will
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become moot before the decision below is ever reviewed on the
merits, for regardless of whether black or white candidates
are elected in November 1978 or November 1980, those candidates
will have answered to a small, single district constituency,
and cognizant thereof, may and likely will direct that the
pending appeal be dismissed, notwithstanding the fact that
heretofore there has been no agitation in Burke County for
district voting .

Consequently, the order of the Court below

contains bui t- i n means for insuring that its correctness will
never be cons ide red, with the end result being that a state
law will have been struck down and the political structure of
the county altered by the exercise of federal judicial power
which was erroneous when made but practically immune to review.
28.
A stay therefore should be granted because:
(1)

The importance and novelty of the issue presented

as to the effect of the requirement of a showing of intentional
discrimination in Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment ·cases, and
its effect upon the "discriminatory impact" rationale of the
Zimmer criteria.

See International Boxing Club v. United States,

2 L.Ed.2d 15 (1957).
(2)

The importance and novelty of the issue as to

whether the dilution doctrine of White v. Regester, 412

u.s.

755, 765 (1973), applies to county or municipal governments.
See Wise v. Lipscomb, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978) - opinion of Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart,
and Mr . Justice Powell.
(3)

The drastic character of the judgment below -

striking down a law which has been in effect for 67 years, and
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which the Court below found was not enacted for a discriminatory
purpose , and in effect ordering a redistricting of county
government under a plan deliberately gerrymandered to insure
election of two black commissioners by creation of two districts
over 70% black.

International Boxing Club v. United States_,

supra.
(4)

The ordering in effect of a plan proposed by

plaintiffs which on its face is calculated to dilute white
voting strength by placing 3 of the incumbent commissioners in
one district, while being careful to place two of the plaintiffcandidates in the separate, predominantly black districts.
(5)

The pendency of somewhat similar questions in

the Mobile case (No. 77-1844, 47 Law Week 3221) now before this
Court.

See Yasa v. Esperdy, 4 L.Ed.2d 1717 (1960).
(6)

The existence of substantial reasons to believe

that the findings made below will be held to be clearly erroneous
so that applicants might then prevail.

Board of Education v.

Taylor, 82 S.Ct. 10 (Opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).
(7)

The likelihood that four members of this Court

will vote to grant review. Appalachian Power Co. v. American
Institute of C.P.A., 4 L.Ed.2d 30, 32 (1959) (Opinion of Mr.
Justice Brennan); City of Boston v. Anderson, 47 L.W. 3277
(October 24, 1978- Opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).

See Wise

v. Lipscomb, supra, where 4 Justices of this Court recently
posed the question as to whether the dilution doctrine even
applied to the political subdivisions of a state.
(8)

The irreparable injury likely to be inflicted

upon applicants should the stay be denied and the decision
below ultimately determined to be incorrect in some other
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case.

(See Par. No. 27, supra).

On the other hand, there is

no such prospect of irreparable injury being inflicted on
plaintiffs even assuming the judgment below is held to be
correct on appeal.

At most, an election would be held in the

same manner that they have been held for 67 years, in which
the undisp ted evidence shows that blacks are free to vote,
without hindrance, and with the present capability to control
the outcome.

The balance of equities clearly preponderates in

favor of applicants.

City of Boston· v. Anderson, 47 L.W. 3277

(Oct. 24, 1978, Opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).
WHEREFORE, Applicants pray that a stay be granted
of the district court's order and judgment, pending appeal.

P.

o.

Box 88

PRESTON B. LEWIS
LEWIS & LEWIS

Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

P.

o.

Box 896

Elberton, Georgia 30635
ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANTS
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FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CI~CUIT

acr 26 '18
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No. 78-3241

HERMAN LODGE, ET AL.

1

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
J. F. BUXTON, ET AL.,

Defendants,

,
RAY DeLAI GLE , ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia

--- --

Before

THORNBERRY; ·GODBOLD and RUBIN, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:
I

IT IS ORDERED that appellants' motion for stay pending appeal

•

..

_.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
HERMAN LODGE, SHELLY
COLEMAN, LIZZIE M. SAMS,
K. C. CHILDERS, REV.
DAVID NELSON, TALMADGE
D. LODGE, WOODROW HARVEY,
and LEVI CRAWFORD,
individually and on
behalf of all those
similarly situated,

*
*

CIVIL ACTION
NO. 176-55

*

*
. *

Plain tiffs

*

vs.

*

J. F. ~UXTON, QU I NTON
ROGERS, ~OY MARCHMAN and
RAY HARPER, individually
and as members of the
Board of Commissioners of
Roads and Revenues for
Burke County, and their
' successors in office;
A. HOLLAND GNANN, OTTO B.
JOHNSON, and WALL T.
THOMPSON, Individually
and in their official
capacities as members
of the Board of Elections
for Burke County, Georgia,
and RAY DeLAIGLE,
Individually and in his
official capacity as a
member· of the Board of
Commissioners of Burke
County,

u. s. DlSTRlC! COUHl
D1striot ot Go.
F1le4 in otfioo

~utbero

\ ~-~- ~

'). Jl ~

~- ~ 9~-:_.LL t./L~ •. . :/[0!;{/)tt-t.:~
_S-EP_:-:_,2 9

./)

Deputy Clerk

*
*

*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*

*

Defendants

0 R D E R

Following a ' bench trial lasting several days in this
voting dilution case, the Court has come to the conclusion:

1.

that the plaintiffs are entitled to prevail,

2.

that the present members of the Board of Commissioners

for Burke County have been elected in an unconstitutional
election and shall be replaced by new commissioners elected
in accordance with the election provided herein,

3.

that Burke County shall be divided into five districts,

in accordance with the map designed as Plaintiffs' Exhibit
No~

300,

EXHIBIT "A"

,

....- ....,,......,...

..
4.

t hat the duly qualified voters of each such .district

shall elect one of its r e sidents otherwise qualified by Georgia
law who may or may not be freeholders of such district as one
of the County Commissioners of Burke County for the five-member
commission,
5.

that defendants shall open and accept qualifications

for candidates for said p9sitions commencing immediately and
until 12:00 o'clock noon, October 16, 1978, (the qualifying
fee shall 'be the same as· otherwise provided by Georgia law in
special elections for such positions), and
6.

that the election for said new commissioners shall

be held at the same time as the General Election to ·be held
in 1978 for th e 0 lection of the Governor of the State and·
the members of the United States Congress fr6m

~eorgia.

The individua ls elected as Commissioners of Burke County
pursuant to this Order shall serve for a period of two years,
after which their successors shall be elected in 1980 for
four-year terms, as otherwise provided by law.
This Order will presently be supplemented and

support~d

by the entry of appropriate findings of fact and conclusions
of law.

The Court, because of other pressing business, has

been unable to place its findings and conclusions in proper
final form.

Accordingly, the Court deemed it imperative to

enter the instant Order so that the maximum amount of time
could be accorded the candidates to prepare for the election
ordered herein.
The parties are directed to cooperate in technical
aspects of holding said election so as to eliminate any unnecessary problems therein.
~9

So Ordered, this

11-

day of September, 1978.

~

II,_
UJ.-__

chief Judge, Jn~d States District
Court, South n District of Georgia
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IN T~E UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR 'fHE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
. AUGUSTA DIVISION
HERMAN LODGE, SHELLY
COLEMAN, LIZZIE M. SAMS,
K. C. CHILDERS, REV.
DAVID NELSON, TALMADGE
D. LODGE, WOODROW HARVEY,
and LEVI CRAWFORD,
individually and on
behalf of all those
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs

vs .
:-

J. F.

CIVIL ACTION

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

BUX~L'ON, QUI NTON
ROGERS, ROY MARCHMAN and
RAY HARPER, ind i v idually
and as members o f the
Board of Commissioners of
Roads and Revenues for ·
Burke County, and their
*
successors in office;
A. HOLLAND GNANN, OTTO B. *
JOHNSON, and WALL T.
THOMPSON, Individually
*
and in their official
Capacities as members
*
of the Board of Elections
For Burke County, Georgia, *
and RAY DeLAIGLE,
Individually and in his
*
official capacity as a
member of the Board of
*
Commissioners of Burke
County,
*

NO. 176-55
U.. 'S. t~.i~ J.Gl' (').ll.~U
~rtJwnJ JJ!L;t.r.t~t •:\' tt!:s.
l'!lt..-1 i.JJ r.t'f i1:!"

----.f'.stJ. .Pt.

-·--~CT_2_~ ;~~; ·.:

. ,1

~~~/

'·

*

Defendants

'FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This action for declaratory judgment was tried by the
Court without a jury.

The named plaintiffs and other black

1

residents

of Burke County, Georgia, brought this action to

challenge the existing method of selecting their five county

1

This action was certified as a class action by the
Court's Order of May 12, 1977. The certified class consists
"of all black citizens of Burke County, Georgia."

EXHXBIT "B"
:

• • ••:;

.

:

•

•

,..~~ ...:. ...

-

...

,, .•u-a.,.,,,,,, •. ,.. ,

~'

•• •• l;;•

"

•

•

..

2

commissioners,

charging the method unlawfully diluted the

strength of their votes.

Plaintiffs pray that the County

be· divided into single-member districts in order to eliminate
the conditions producing the unlawful dilution.

For the

reasons that are set out below, the Court finds for the
plaintiffs.
According to plaintiffs, Blacks are not and cannot be
elected to the County Commission, or generally to other elected
positions, because the

"at-large~

dilutes black voting strength.

system in use minimizes and

No Black has ever been elected

!'

to the County Commi ssion, in spite of the fact that historically

2

The Board of Commissioners of Burke County, as presently
constituted, derives from Georgia Laws of 1911, p. 390. According to Section 1 of that Act, the Board of Commissioners
of Roads and Revenues for Burke County consisted of five persons
elected by the qualified voters of the county, all to be elected
at the same time. Candidates were required to be resident
freeholders of the county for at least three years prior to
the election and, in addition, had to attain at least 28 years
. of . age and be eligible to election as a member of the General
Assembly of the State.
The 1911 law was amended in 1929 by Georgia Laws of 1929,
p. 548, to provide that the members of the County Commission
be appointed by the Grand Jury of Burke County.
This law was in turn amended by Georgia Laws of 1931, p.
400, providing agaih that the county commissioners be elected
by the qualified voters of the County. That Act requires
that any candidate be· a · resident freeholder of the county for
at least three years prior to election, and that property
ownership requirement has been continued in the law to this
date.
All five county commissioners in Burke County are elected
at the same time and for terms of four years, so that there
are County Commission elections only once every four years.
A majority vote is required for the nomination and election
of any county cornmi~sioner, and county commissioners must run,
both in primary and general elections for specific numbered
posts. Neither of these practices was implemented in Burke
County until they were imposed by general s~ate law in 1964.
Qa. Code Ann. SS 34-1015 and 1513.
(Defendants• Answer, • 9).
The next regularly scheduled election for county commissioners in Burke County is November, 1980, with primaries to
be held several months prior thereto.
No residency requirements, or subdistrict requirement
exists for the election of individuals to the Burke County
Commission.

•••·C

, ......- ....,,..•.. ,.

..

3

Burke COUI 1ty hc\S more Bhtcks than Wl:li tes.

However, as

defendants are quick to point out,
"[t]he Constitution does not demand that each
cogn :l : ~eable element of a constituency elect
repr~sentatives in proportion to its voting
· strength. Even consistent defeat of a group's
candidates, standing alone, does not cross
constitutional bounds."
(Citations omitted).
Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 216 (5th Cir. 1978) (hereinafter
Nevett II).

It i s the plaintiffs' burden to go beneath the

surface and show t he Court, regardless of form, an unlawful
voting dilution of constitutional dimensions "[b]y producing
evidence to suppor1; findings that the political processes .
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to
participation by the group in question

"

Id.

Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the present method of
nominating and electing the Board of Commissioners of Roads
and Revenues for Burke County, including the use of numbered

3

•

The following is the population and percentage of population by race in Burke County between 1930 and 1970 according to
plaintiffs' exhibits 59, 108, 109.1 1101 and 191, of which the
Court takes judicial notice:
*a
PERCENTAGE
*b
WHITE
BLACK

TOTAL
YEAR
-*c
1975
1970
1960
1950
1940
1930

POPULATION

42%
40%
34%
29%
25%
22%

101700
10,988
201596
23,458
261520
29,224

58%
60%
66%
78%
75%
78%

*a
Percentage is to the nearest whole percent.
*b
The "percentage white" figure includes a category labelled
:foreign born white": the greatest number in this group was 421
in 1930. After 1930, this statistic apparently was not kept.
*c
The 1975 figures are a mid-census estimate taken from
plaintiffs' exhibit 191.
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posts, majority vote, run-offs and elections at-large,

dilutes

the relative . strength of their vote in violation of the rights
guaranteed them by the f i rst, thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments of the Constitution.

Plaintiffs also

claim that Burke County's election system violated 42 U.S.C.
§§

1971, 1973, and 1983.
Although plaintiffs assert a statutory theory of relief,

the Court does not reach the issues raised by this theory, ·
only recently di s cussed in special concurrence by Judge Wisdom,
in Nevett II, 57 1

~.2d

at 231.

Since the Fifth Circuit has

not addressed th is theory in an operative context, and since
plaintiffs have presented a strong case with respect to the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, the Court follows the
test enunciated in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th
Cir. 1973), en bane, aff'd

sub~;

School Board v. Marshall, 424

u.s.

~ast

Carroll Parish

636 (1976) and Kirksey v •

. Board of Supervisors .of Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.)
·(~bane),

cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3354 (1977); recently

described in United States v. Board of Supervisors of Forrest
County, 571 F.2d 951, 953-54 (5th Cir. 1978), as a "multi-step
inquiry."
Before describing and undertaking the "multi-step inquiry,"
the Court notes that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
. decided in Nevett II that

II

• • [a demonstration of intention)

• • • is necessary under both fourteenth and fifteenth amendments," as a requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote
dilution.

Nevett II, .571 F.2d at 221.1 Functional.ly, this

added requirement has not changed the district court's task

4

Of course, multi-member districts, or county-wide
elections systems are not per !! unconstitutional. . Fortson
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
-4-
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since "a fj .nding of racially discriminatory dilution under
the Zimmer criteria raises an inference of intent and,
therefore, . • . a finding under the criteria satisfies the
intent requirement. •

Nevett II, 571 F.2d at 217.

"

As stated above, "Zimmer and Kirksey have established a
multi-step inquiry for determining whether a districting plan
[or election system) unlawfully dilutes a minority's participation in the political process.

The testing seeks to

determine whether the plan either is a racially motiv.a ted
gerrymander or per petuates an existent denial of access to.
the political process."

United States v. Board of Supervisors.

of Forrest County, 571 F.2d 951, 953 (S.D. Miss. 1978).

J There

is no question of a racial gerrymander involved here;

rather, the question is whether the system perpetuates an
existent denial of access to the poli ti·cal process.

This

question requires "that the court first investigate _whether
· the minority community is
political process.
this investigation."

pre~ently

denied access to the

Zimmer enumerates several tests to guide
United States v. Board of Supervisors

of Forrest County, 571 F.2d at 953.
"The court in Zimmer established two
categories [of factors), · one containing criteria
going primarlly to the issue of denial of access
or dilution, the other containing inquiries as
to the existence of certain structural voting
deyices that may enhance the underlying dilution.
The 'primary' factors include: the group's accessibility to political processes (such as the
slating of candidates), the responsiveness of
representatives to the 'particularized interests'
of the group, the weight of the state policy behind
at-large dist~icting, and the effect of past discrimination upon the group's participation in the
election system. 485 F.2d at 1305. The 'enhancing'
factors include: the size of the districti the
portion of the vote necessary for election (majority
or plurality); where the positions are not contested for individually, the number of candidates for
which an elector must votei and whether candi.d ates
must reside in subdistricts."
Nevett II, 571 F.2d at 217.
-5-
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It must

be~

remembered that the Court is not limited in

its determination only to the Zimmer factors, rather the
Court may consider the Zimmer factors, "or similar ones."
Kirksey
at 143.

v~

Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F.2d

One "similar factor" considered in Kirksey

which did not seem to be an explicit

prim~ry

factor in the

Zimmer formula, is a depressed socio-economic status,
"which makes participation in community
Id.

proces~es

difficult." ,

This i s a n i mportant factor and it must be considered

here.
Finally, i n o rder to succeed, plaintiffs need not demonstrate the existence of each of the primary factors, rather
"[b]y proof of an aggregation of at least
some of these factors, or similar ones, a
plaintiff can demonstrate that .the members
of the particular group in question are being
' denied access."
Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of Hinds County, 554 F.2d

139~

143 (S.D. Miss, 1977).
'·

The Court will discuss the primary factors in Part I,
enhancing factors in Part II, conclusion in Part III, and
relief in Part IV.

I.

A.

HISTORY OF PAST DISCRIMINATION
The history of•past discrimination is included as a
factor in the dilution equation because the legacy of past
discrimination may preclude a minority .g roup's effective
parti9ipation in the political process.

The Court finds

.· plaintiffs have produced sufficient evidence of past discrimination to demonstrate that they have been unfairly denied
-6-

t.

such effective participation.

Moreover, it is evident that

the present scheme of electing county commissioners, although
racially neutral when adopted, is being maintained for invidious purposes .

Compare Bolden v. City of Mobile, 571 F.2d

238 (5th Cir. 19 78 ).
The first f ac t which plaintiffs have established demonstrating this element of the Zimmer-Kirksey recipe is a
link between past discrimination and low black voter registration.

Before enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, Black

.suffrage in Burke c;ounty was virtually non-existent.

As of

December 19, 1962 only 427, or 6.5% of the eligible Blacks
5

were even registered.

Following the Act's passage and by

August 31, 1967, Black voter registration increased to 2,760
or 41.8% of the eligible Blacks.

Today, approximately 38%
6

of the eligible Blacks are registered to vote in Burke County • .
The marked increase in the registration of Blacks following the
enactment of the 1965 Voting Rights Act clearly indicates that
· past discrimination has had an adverse effect on Black voter
registration which lingers to this date.
There was a clear evidence of bloc voting the only.
time Blacks ran for · County Commissioner.
be ascribed in part

5
1977~

~o

Obviously, this must

past discrimination.

There are three

Plaintiffs' Reques~·of Judicial Notice . £1led February 16,
Exhibit "E" •
•

6
~·

Plaintiffs claim the respective percentages of registered
eligible voters are 3a% Black and 62% White, ·while defendants
claim there are 44% Black and 56% White. Either set of figures
· supports the Court's conclusion. Although there was some dispute
·about these figures, neither party challenged the 1970 census
. report on which the County Commission Election District Plan
selected by the Court is based.
-7-

Militia Districts in which Blacks are in a clear majority,
7

the 66th, 72d and 74th.

In a fourth district, the 69th, as

of 1978, there were only a few more Blacks than Whites.
black candidate,

~1r.

One

Childers, won in the four black districts,

losing in all of the others.

The other black candidate, Mr.

Reynolds, won in three of the black districts losing in all of
8

the others.
Similarl y , i n 1970 Dr. John Palmer, a white physician
:-

from Waynewbor o , who opened the first integrated waiting room
in Burke County , r an for County Commissioner.

Generally, he

was thought of a s being sympathetic to black political interests.
He was soundly defeated.

7
The Court finds the following to be a reasonably accurate ·
estimate of the registered voters by race in each district, as
of 1978.
Precinct
Waynesboro
Munnerlyn
Alexander
Sardis
Keysville
Shell Bluff Greenscutt
Girar-d
St. Clair
Vidette
Gough
Midville
Scotts Store

60-62 District
6lst District
63rd ·District
64th District
65th District
66th District
67th District
68th District
69th District
7lst District
72d District
73rd District
74th• District
Total

...

Black

White

Total

1,050
44
75
211
163
167
49
110
29
52
201
184
98

2,149

104
478
214
82
215
195
26
112
68
195
52

3,199
94
179
689
377
249
264
305
55
164
269
379
150

2,433

3,940

6,373

so

8

Plaintiffs' Request for Admissions, filed June 5, 1978,
. Exhibits I-3 and I-4.

-8-
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In the recent city Gouncil election in Waynesboro, the
counti sea t, a Black was elected to the council for the first
time in h i story.

This event can be attributed to the high

degree of bloc voting, and to the fact that the elected Black
9

ran in a distr i ct with a high percentage of black residents .
Past discrimination in education has also precluded
effective bl ack political participation.

Burke County schools

discriminated a ga i nst Blacks as recently as 1968.

Bennet v.

Evans, Civil No . 1369 (S.D. Ga), Order entered June 20, 1969.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 59.

And there are still schools like Gough

Elementary and Girard Elementary that remain essentially segregated.

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 233.

Moreover, the Court finds that,

as a group, Burke County Blacks have completed less formal
education than Whites.

Of the 4,476 black inhabitants of the

County over 25 years of age, 346 (7.7%) never attended high
school, 247 (5.5%) finished high school, and 123 (2.7%) finished
college; while of the 4,281 white residents of the same ·age,
·83 (1.9%) never attended school, 661 (15.2%) finished high
10
school, and 308 (7.1%) finished college.
Based on the testimony of the experts, one reason Blacks, as a group, have been
ineffective in the political process, is the fact that they
have .completed less formal education.

The Court concludes

that this condition is a direct result of the history of invidious discrimination in Burke County.
Past discrmination has also directly chilled the opportunity
for Blacks' becoming involved in the Democratic Party Primary.
The Court notes it was not until 1946 that the "white primary"
•
was struck down in Chapman v. King, 154 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946).

The Court also finds past

9

This was possible because this Court created single-member
districts. See Sullivan v. DeLoach, Civil No. 176-238 (S.D~ Ga.)
Order entered September 11, 1977.
10
Plaintiffs' Supplementary Answer to Defendants' First
Interrogatories, filed March 2, 1977, Exhibit "A".
-9-
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discrimination has kept BJ acks from becoming members of the
B\,lrke Count:.y Democratic E>cecutive Conunittee.
until after this lawsuit

~;as

It was not

filed that the Executive Committee,

which conducts the only party primary in the county, gained · a
Black as one of its twenty-four members.
The Court finds evidence of present discrimination unfairly precluding Blacks from effective political participation
in the requirements established by Ga. Code Ann.

§

34-605,

which states in pertinent part that "[n]o person shall be
eligible to serve as chief registrar unless such person owns
interest

in · r e ~ l

property • • •

"

A reference to Plaintiffs'

Exhibits 66-69 make s it readily apparent that significantly
fewer Blacks than Whites are freeholders.

The Court finds

this is in part due to past discrimination, thus buttressing
the Court's conclusion that Blacks are being unfairly preeluded from participating in the political process.
·Moreover, Burke County Blacks were compelled to turn
to this Court to eliminate the existing racially discriminatory
system of selecting Grand Jurors.

See Sapp v. ·Rowland, Civil

No. 176-94 (S.D. Ga.) Order entered May 20, 1977.
Without specifically reiterating the statistics on hiring,
the Court finds that as a result of the lingering effects of
past discrimination, the County's hiring pattern has been
carried out in a manner detrimental to the black community,
particularly when one compares the number of Blacks hired to

.,
I

the number of Whites, or the salaries and positions they
11
respectively hold.
The Court also notes that many of the
•
Blacks employed by the county are not in fact paid by the
county, but from federal fundings.

11

Plaintiffs' R~quest for Admissions, filed June 5, 1978,
Exhibit I-1. Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories filed June 14, 1976, Exhibit "C".
-10-
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The Court finds that the effects of past discrimination has
dirE~ct

been a

influence on the County Commissioners' failure

to appoint more Blacks to the various committees and boards
which oversee, or direct the execution of the county government.
Without enumerating such committees and boards and the · related
statistics, the Court points to one symbolic example of the
Commissioners' attitude in.this respect.

In appointing persons

to serve on the Bi-Centennial Committee, the Commissioners
12
appointed four t e e n Whites and one Black.
The Court a lsq takes · notice of Georgia laws demonstra.t ing
.
13
a discriminatory i ntent.
See generally Plaintiffs' Supplernentary Answers to Defendants' First Interrogatories, filed
June 25, 1976, Answer 1, for a history of racial discrimination
in Georgia.
The Court also finds discrimination present in the form
of a segregated laundromat's being operated within a few blocks
14
of the· county.courthouse.
The Court concludes, based on the evidence discussed above,
plaintiffs have demonstrated ample evidence of present effects
of past discrimination for . the purpose of establishing this
element of. the Zimmer-Kirksey test.

B.

UNRESPONSIVENESS OF ELECTED OFFICIALS
Unresponsiveness to the needs . of Burke County . Blacks "may
be proved by present evidence and by lingering effects of past
•

12
Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories,
filed June 14, 1976.
13

.
Plaintiffs' Supplementary Answers to Defendants' First
Interrogator.i es, filed June 25, 1976, Answer 1.

14
Testimony of Ms. Sullivan and Plaintiffs' Exhibits 239-42.
-11-
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discrimination."

United States v. Board of Supervisors of

F.orrest County, 571 F.2d 951, 954-55

n.

6 (5th Cir. 1978)

(quoting f r om Kirksey, 554 F.2d at 144-45).
While the County

Co~nissioners

have taken advantage of

most federally funded programs which were designed to meet
the needs of the disenfranchised, · the Court finds the County
Cornmissiom~rs,

as an elected body, have acted with an insensi-

tivity to the particularized needs of the black community
amounting t o unresponsiveness.

For instance, "lingering

effects of past discrimination" still haunt the county court:-

house; there is a "Nigger-hook" at the water fountain, and
the toilet si gns f or "Coloreds" and "Whites" still appear
through faded pa int .
One of the important functions of the County Commissioners
is to appoint peopl e to the various boards and committees which
oversee execution of the county government.
above.

See Section A

Although Blacks may not be entitled to be represented

on the boards or committees in proportion to their frequency in
the general population, the rare appointment

of Blacks amounts

to nothing more than a token afterthought, or simply to meet
federal guidelines.
of Burke County

It is the Court's impression that Blacks

desir~,

and desperately

need~

to play a mean-

ingful role in their local government; to be able to work within
the system, rather than to be forced to attack it from without.
The Commissioners have been singularly unresponsive to this
need.

This is particularly evident when one considers the

racially unbalanced committee appointments. It is highlighted
•
by the fact that Blacks are just beginning to break into the
ranks of committees whose function is to oversee agencies of

-the county government

that work principally with Blacks.

As

an example, it was not until recently that a Black was appointed
to the committee overseeing the Department of Family and Children
Services.

The Commissioners' continued failure to view problems
-12-
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with racial impartiality as well as their unresponsiveness is
shown by the procedures used to select the Judge for the Burke
County Small Claims Court.

That court was created at the re-

quest of t he small, local merchants, the majority of whom are
. White, to collect unpaiq consumer debts.

The judge selection

process is of note here .in that the Commissioners selected a
committee to pick the

Jud~e.

However, they failed to appoint

anyone to the committee who could fairly consider potential
interests of defendants, most of whom are Black.

The Court .

finds that much in the same manner that the Commissioner's
~

have been unres ponsive in committee appointments, they have
also been unresponsive in their hiring policies.

Although the

Commissioners do not hire everyone who works for the county,
their policy sets the tenor for the county's hiring.

As noted

above in Section A, most Blacks hold lower paying jobs, and
from the testimony, it appeared that the majority of· Blacks
employed by the county were paid with federal money, whereas .
white employees were usually paid from county funds.
The Commissioners have also shown unresponsiveness in
the paving of · county roads.

Although the evidence in this

regard was not presented with precision or complete clarity,
the Court finds

tha~

the Commissioners' paving decisions have

exhibited a racially discriminatory pattern, thus demonstrating
15

unresponsiveness.
ing:

(1)

In particular, the Court notes the follow-

The Mamie Jo Rhodes Subdivision, inhabited by Blacks,

is unpaved.
by Whites.

It is directly across from a subdivision inhabited
The latter has paved roads.

(2)

Millers Pond Road

is paved up to the pond, used by Whites; but from that point

...
·

the road is unpaved, although that portion is inhabited by
Blacks.

(3)

Paving on Hatchett Road ends at the residence of

15

In the main, for its conclusion on this point, the Court
relies on the te~timony of Messrs. Harvey, Hopper, Kitchens,
Lodge, and Smith, in conjunction with Plaintiffs' Exhibit 279.
-13-
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a White: yet Blacks live on the
(4)

road.

remaind~r

of the unpaved

The streets of Alexander are paved in the section

of town inhabited by Whiles: but the roads in the black section
are not paved .

And (5) county road 284 is paved to the point

where the last · white lives, but beyond, where the road is
inhabited by

It is of interest
16
to note that the road to the dog trial field
is paved even
Black~

the road is unpaved.

though trials are held

bu~

once a year.

still an unpaved road to a school.

By contrast, there is

Although the last unpaved

road to a white school was paved in 1930, it seems as if the
road to the

Palmer~Elementary

School, formerly an all-black

school, and still predominatly black, remains unpaved.

While

the defendants point out instances where Whites were living · on
unpaved roads, and that they had recently paved "Lodge Circle"
of primary benefit to one of the named plaintiffs, the Court
finds plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated defendants'
17
unresponsiveness in the form of their paving decisions.
The Court finds that pnce Blacks have made their needs
known, the sluggishness, . or bureaucratic "run-a-round" to
which they · repeatedly have been subjected amounts to unresponsiveness.

As a result, Blacks have been forced outside the local

government for relief.

They went .to the courts to seek school

and Grand Jury integration (see Section A above), and to the
streets to "agitate," as defendants have said, to get lighting
at the Davis Park ball . field.

Outside pressure had to come to

bear before the county budged.
The county did, indeed, establish additional registration
sites.

-·

.

But only after a pre-trial conference before and

"friendly persuasion" by this Court.

~he

defendants' tepidity

16

Burke County is famous as a center for bird dog field
· trials.
17

There was also testimony about "political roads," i.e.,
pork-barrel projects whereby the local state representative-could
bequeath a road to a political friend. According to defendants'
testimony, the County Commissioners had little control over these
roads. However, the Court still finds such "political roads" indicative of Blacks' lack of access to the system, since no witness
could remember a Black who had been blessed with such a road.

·•

was fure1er demonstrated by the fact that a period of four
months wa s required to get the registration cards to the
new sites ; and that the new sites were operative only a
short whi le before the registration period ended.

Admittedly,

the County Commissioners recently approved a transportation
system that should help solve access problems for some; but
only after being prodded .by the prosecution of this lawsuit.
The Commissioners' sluggishness in this respect is another
example of their unresponsiveness to the black members of
the community.

~

Another area in which the defendants have exhibited unresponsivene s s ha s been in public educatiori.

This

manifest~d

itself in the for m of conflicts of interest, · if not outright
breaches of the p ublic trust.

There was evidence· that in

the early sixti e s , when desegregation of public schools was
beginning to become an inevitable reality, the County Com. missioners showed their colors by .b eing among the ·incorporators
of the all-white Edmund Burke Academy.

·There is more.

The .

Commissioners then donated public funds to buy band uniforms
for the private school's band, despite advice to the contrary
by the county attorney.
The Court finds, based primarily on the defendants'
continued failure to make Blacks a viable part of the county
governmen~

that the Commissioneers, as a result of the lingering

effects of past discrimination, have been unresponsive to plaintiffs' needs.

The Court finds this factor must be inciuded as

part of the aggregate of factors to be considered in determining
the existence of vote dilution.
The Court concludes that the insensitivity of defendants
to the needs of the plaintiff class exists because of inviduous
racial motivations.
-15-
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c.
DEPRESSED SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
One of the factors the Kirksey court identified as being
indicative of denial of access to political process is "a
depressed sotioeconomic status."
Supervisors of Hinds

Count~,

554

Kirksey v. Board of
F~2d

139, 143 (5th Cir. 1977).

The socio-economic status of Blacks in Burke County is
18
clearly depre s sed .
According to Plaintiffs' Exhibits 66
·and 67, of t he 1,7 31 families in Burke County with incomes
below the pover ty level, 1,467 were Black and 274 were White.
Given that Blacks are 60% of the population, there are approximately 25% more Blacks whose income is at a poverty level than
should be expected.

The picture looks even worse when one

notices that nearly 53% of black families had incomes threefourths, or less, of a poverty level income.

The Court finds

this is in part caused by past discrimination.
In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397

u.s.

254 (1970), the Supreme

Court stressed that the plaintiffs' lack of resources was one
of the primary reasons for its holding.

Admitted.ly, Goldberg

was not a voting rights case, but the same careful consideration
must be given by this Court to the factor of income because to
more than half of the plaintiffs, the "need to concentrate
upon finding the means for daily sustenance, in turn, adversely
affects [their] ability to seek redress from • • • [the local)
19
bureaucracy." Goldberg, supra at 264.
To this end, the opportunity to cast an undiluted vote becomes indispensable.

Ac-

cordingly, the Court is constrained to find, within the context
•
18
It appears that Burke County must be an undesirable
place for Blacks considering the steady decrease in the county's
black population. Between 1930 and 1970, Burke County's black
population has decreased from 78% to 58% of the total population .
. Moreover, 99% of Burke County's Blacks were born in Georgia,
while 24% of Burke County's Whites were born out of state. This
exodus is probably tied, in part, to past discrimination, and
present economic inequality between the races. Plaintiffs'
Exhibits 59, 108, 109, 110, and 191.
19
The verity of this statement was supported by the testimony of both experts.

,
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of the Zilnmer-Kirksey aggregate test, that the economic plight
of a substantial majority of plaintiffs is tied to past discrimination, and is indicative of their lack of access to the
political process.

See also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 ·

(1974).
In addition to a depressed economic status, Blacks in
Burke County are subject to a depressed social status.

Although

there is no single indicia which the social scientists have
identified a s

d ~t e rminative

of social status, some of the

factors identif ied ,are present here.
the Court turns i s education.

The first index to which

Education, or the lack thereof,

is an indicator of social status, and according to the experts,
would influence the likelihood of a minority group's effective
participation in the political process.

Objective statistics

show that Blacks have completed less formal education than
20

Whites.

It appears without serious dispute that what education

Blacks did receive was qualitatively inferior to a marked degree.
· Per capita spending for the education of black students was
21

much less than for their white counterpart.

The Court finds

that the unbroken history of an inferior formal education has
had an does now have a strong tendency to preclude Blacks'
effective participation in the political process.
There is additional evidence which illustrates the fact
that Blacks in Burke County have a depressed socio-economic
status.

When one examines Plaintiffs' Exhibits 64 and 65, he

learns that Blacks tend to receive less pay for similar work,
and that Blacks tend to have the more menial jobs.

Housing for

Blacks also tends to be inferior, according to Plaintiffs'

20

· Plaintiffs' Supplementary Answers to Defendants' First
filed March 2, 1977, Exhibit "A".

Interrog~tories,

21

Plaintiffs' Exhibit 278.
-17-
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Supplementary Answers to Defendants' First Interrogatories,
filed June 25, 1976, Exhibit A.

This exhibit depicts that 73%

of the houses occupied by Blacks lacked some, or .all, plumbing
facilities, whi l e only 16% of the houses occupied by Whites
suffered the same shortcomings.
The Court must conclude that, unfortunately, Blacks in
Burke County suffer a depressed socio-economic status due in
part to the lingering effects of past discrimination.

D.

LACK OF ACCESS TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The political. process, in a voting dilution context,
has received both a literal and a broad interpretation.

It

not only has been interpreted to mean physical access to the
voting and election processes, i.e., "access of the individual
to the ballot box or voting booth • • • " but also to include
whether a group has input into the political decision-

"

making process •
~inds

II

Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors of

County, 554 F.2d 139, 143 n. 10.

The Court finds that in

the past, as well as in the present, plaintiffs . have been denied
equal access to the political process.
Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Acts of 1965,
Blacks in Georgia were unfairly denied access to the election
processes by such devices as literacy tests, poll taxes, and
22
white primaries.
Plaintiffs tried to demonstrate that the
Georgia "purge law" (Ga. Code~· S 34-624), was such a
23
device,
and presently works an unfair denial of access on

-·

.·plaintiffs.

The Court finds plaintiffs .have failed to prove

22
Plaintiffs' Supplementary Answers to Defendants' First
· Interrogatories, filed June 25, 1976, Answer 1.
23
The 1976 Georgia Constitution still demands a literacy
and ".good character and understanding" test as a requisite for
voting, although this provision is suspended by the 1965 Voting
Rights Act.
-18, . . . . .-
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for their failure to demonstrate adequately

that more Blacks than Whites are purged; or that a two-year
period is unduly restrictive towards Blacks.

The Court makes

this finding even though plaintiffs have successfully shown
that Blacks, by virtue of their relatively severe degree of
poverty, i:he size of the county (Part II, Section A below),
and the absence of a public transportation system, are more
likely than Whites to have a problem physically getting to
the polling p 2acl

>

where they may exercise their most fundamental

of rights .
'
Although plai ntiffs
here were unable to show a denial

of access to specific voting processes, similar to the obviously eggregious denials in · Kirksey, i.e., disqualification
I

of certain black candidates by the county election commission,
or a conditioning of primary participation upon a pledge of
party loyalty, the Court finds a denial of access, in part,
caused by the llngering effects .of past discrimination, in
the virtual absence of Blacks.on the Democratic Executive
Committee.

.Defendants attempted to refute a potential finding

of this nature by minimizing the role played by the Democratic
Executive Committee in Burke

C~unty

politics.

Defendants .

pointed out that primary slating is open, and that the Executive Committee has never actively supported a candidate.
These facts, however., must be viewed in a proper context
rather than in a vacuum.

The context demonstrates that by

state law, the committee may provide poll officers,
~~·

S 34-501; poll watchers,

•
substituted nominations, Ga

~· ~ ~·

~

!na·

~·

~

S 34-1310(b); and,

S 34A-903.

Election in
•
the primary is "tantamount" to election to the office. The
Executive Committee elects and sends representatives to the
various political conventions.

The court concludes, therefore,

contrary to defendants' urgings, that the Democratic Executive
Committee does indeed play an important, albeit subtle, part
in Burke County politics.
-19-
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In addition to the tasks listed above, the Executive
Committee is required by its national and state charters to
24
"insure full participation by all segments of society."
The lingering effects of past discrimination are highlighted
by the fact that in spite of these affirmative action
requirements, when the Committee recently designed a subdistrict election scheme for the election of its twenty-four
25
members, no Blacks were asked for their input to the plan.
The Court finds t he lingering effects of past discrimination to
be an importa n t c a use of a virtual "lilly-white" Democratic
~

Executive Commi t tee.

This fact must be· added into the sum

producing the unfair exclusion of Blacks from the political
process.
The Court also finds that the effects of past discrimination exclude Blacks from the personal contact politics of
Burke County.

Many of defendants' witnesses testified that

success in Burke County politics is based on the number of
friends one has.

Defendants' ·witnesses stated this was the

case because Burke County has a small population, so that
most of its inhabitants know each other on a personal level.
As a result there is little need for debate at election time
for the Whites who have for centuries dominated the public
scene.

As is further evidenced by testimony of these witnesses,

if the voter personally knows . the candidate, he or she knows ·
the candidate's political stance.

When this factor is combined

'l

wi.th the virtual segregation of all social, religious, and
business organizations excepting that the only significant
•
l

24
_
Article 9, Section 3, of Georgia Democratic Party State
Charter. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 225.
25
.
It is more than interesting to note that the former and
.·present commission· members tes't ified t .h at the political division
caused by a single-member district plan would create an unworkable
County Commission. Yet, Mr. Thompson, himself, a former commissioner and Chairman of the Democratic Executive Committee,
admitted that even though the Executive Committee memberR were
now elected by districts, this n~w system had not impaired the
functioning of the Committee.
-20-
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black-whi t~ e relationships are on an. employee-employer basis,
the result obtains that Blacks are shut out of the normal
27

course of politics in this tightly-knit rural county.
This is no t to say, however, that it is the Court's opinion
that meaningful political dialogue, which fosters responsive
action, cannot develop between an employee and employer.
Rather, the Court notes aAd finds that the combination of
factors discussed above, all of which seem to be related to
past discrimination, operate unfairly to exclude Blacks from
the normal course qi personal contact politics in Burke County.
As a final factor to be ·considered in the Blacks' lack of
meaningful input into the political process, the Court finds,
as discussed above in Section B, that the Commissioners'. failure
to appoint Bl a c ks t o the committees and boards in sufficient
numbers, or a meaningful fashion, is without doubt an unfair
denial of access o f input into the political process.
While the denials of access in this case have not been
· especially blatant, the Court finds in the circumstances of
this rural, tightly-k.n it, racially-separate society, that
such denials, subtle though they may be, have operated unfairly
to keep Blacks from meaningful political input.

E• .

STATE POLICY BEHIND THE
AT-LARGE ELECTION SYSTEM
The Court adopts the reasoning of Chief Judge Edenfield
in Pitts v. Busbee,•Governor, 395 F. Supp. 35, 39 (N.D. Ga. 1975),
~·

26

Based on testimony and Plaintiffs' Exhibits 59-69, and in
particular Exhibit 53.
27

This is especially true for poorer Blacks living in the
more isolated areas of this large county.
-21-
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remanded£~

other SFOunds, 536 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1976), with

respect to the finding that this factor ·is neutral.
But while neutral in origin, it has been subverted to

'•

invidious purposes.

Since it is a statute of local appli-

cation, its enactment, maintenance or alteration is determined
by the desires of representatives in the state legislature of
the county af fe c b >d.
Whites.

Burke Is representatives have always been

Accord i no l y, they have retained a system which has

minimized the ability of Burke County Blacks to participate
in the political system.

II.
THE ENHANCING FACTORS

It appears that the "enhancing" factors have become part
of the dilution "equation" for at least two reasons.

First,

their existence is relatively easy to determine and, second,
their effect on a minority group, though somewhat limited in
comparison to the "primary" factors,· is obvious.
As mentioned

e~rlier,

the Zimmer "enhancing" factors are:

the size of the distr.ict; the portion of the vote necessary for
election (majority or plurality); the number of candidates for
which an elector must vote, where the positions are not contested ·individually; and whether candidates must reside in
subdistricts.

Nevett II, 571 F.2d at 217 •

•
A•

..·

DISTRICT SIZE
Burke County is nearly two-thirds the size of Rhode
. Island, comprising an area of approximately 832 square miles.
-22-
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The raison d'etre of this lawsuit is the fact that the
district is undivided in any way.

That is, it is as large

as it can be in a relative sense.

The geographic size has

made it more difficult for Blacks to get to polling places
or to cornpaign for office.

There was no evidence to show

that other counties in Georgia which have recently adopted
single-member districts compare pejoratively to the "at large"
counties in the i r ability to function.

On the contrary, there

was testimony by d efendants' witness, Mr. Thompson, that the
districting requirement for election to the Democratic Executive Committee has not impaired that organizations ' ability
to function.
The Court finds, as a matter of law, that the size of
the county tends to impair the access of Blacks in Burke
County to the political process.

B.

MAJORITY VOTE REQUIREMENT
Defendants, in paragraph 9 of their answer filed April 4,
1976, admit that by the original act, county commissioners
are to run at-large, that the victor must be elected by a
majority vote, Ga. Code Ann. S 34-1513, and that candidates
run for specific seats, Ga. Code

~·

S 34-1015.

As has been fqund by Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2cS 1297
at 1306 (5th cir. 1973),the majority vote requirement tends
to submerge the will of the minority and to deny the minority's
access .t o the system.
Thfs Court finds that Ga Code Ann. SS 34-1015 and 1513

.- - -

enhance plaintiffs' lack of access to the system.
-23-
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c.
ANTI-SINGLE SHOT RULE

...

As in Nevitt II, there is no anti-single shot voting
provision.

The candidates now run for numbered positions.

However, this Court concludes, as did Judge Pointer in
Nevitt II , that the

numbe~ed

position method has some of

the same cons P-quences as an anti-single shot, multi-member
contest because a cohesive political group, such as the Blacks
here, is unable to concentrate on a single candidate.
.

,.

D.

LACK OF RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT
The present system has no residency requirement.

All

candidates could reside in Waynesboro, or in "lilly-white"
· neighborhc·ods •

To that extent,
the denial of access becomes
'·

enhanced.

II.
CONCLUSION

The Court has considered each of the Zimmer-Kirksey primary
and enhancing factors.
factors are

presen~,

It concludes that eight of the eleven

here, which were present in the' recent

finding of dilution by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Board of Supervisors of Forrest County, 571
F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1978), that is, factors numbered 1, 2, 3, 5,

-24-
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8, 10, and 11.

Since this is a dil~tion case ~ounded

upon "'an intensely local appraisal of the design and
impact of the [at-large] district in the light of past
and present reality, political and otherwise,'" Blacks
United for Lasting Leadership, Inc. v. City of Shreveport,
571 F.2d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 1978) [quoting from White v.
Regester, 412

u.s.

755, 769-70 (W.O. Tex. 1973)], the Court

follows the aggregate test of Zirnmer-Kirksey.
The evidence on the lingering effects of past discrimination, from

t~e

"Nigger-hooks" in the courthouse to

the segregated laundermat, is clearly established.

The

direct effect of past discrimination on access to the
political pr oce ss i s demonstrated by bloc voting by the
County's hir ing pr actices, and, to a greater extent, the
County's committee and board appointment practices.

The

Court also finds past discrimination has played a part in
:

today~s

Black low voter registration.

Past discrimination

has also unfairly affected the quantity and quality of the

28

.
Based on Kirkse¥ v. Hinds County, 554 F.2d 139 (5th
Cir. 1977), the court 1n United States v. Forrest County, 571
F.2d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1978), found the following evidence
constituted a successful claim of voting dilution:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.

8.

9.
10.
11.

no black had been elected to a county
office;
retention of the poll tax aa a requisite ·
to voting until 1966;
retention of a liter•cy teat until 19661
conditioning of primary participation
upon a pledge of party loyalty;
property requirements for candidates
for supervisors,
designation of the county for the use
of federal voting registrars;
disqualification of certain black candidates by the county election comm~asion;
effect of a lower socio-economic level
upon the blacks' ability to participate;
a high rate of bloc voting;
various electoral mechanisms,
lack of responsiveness to the needa of
black residents.
-25-
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education ·r eceived by Burke County's Blacks in the same way
it has affected their social status.

In turn, their social

status, as the experts stated, has had an adverse effect on
their access to the political process.
The Court concludes that defendants are heedless of the
needs of the b l ac k community, whether it be in. the Blacks'
concern for the quality of .education or the quantity of paving •
. The sluggishness with which the Commission moves in response
to Black demands is well-nigh the equivalent of callous
indifference to

th~t

class which has fallen heir to the evil

of two centuries of discrimination.

The Commissioners' lack

of responsiveness is merely an extension of a culture which
could view the vestiges of slavery with unseeing eyes.

Such

indifference attests to the Commissioners' realization of
the Blacks' political impotence, both individually and collectively.
It is clear that Blacks in Burke County have a depressed
· socio-economic status, due in part to past discrimination.

The

fact that a substantial majority of Blacks have incomes ·of
three-fourths; or less than, a poverty level income is an
important factor wi·th respect to access both to the machinery
of the political processes, and to the social avenues of
political access, each of which is moat important in this
tightly-knit, rural county.
As stated before, the Court finds Blacks have been overtly
denied

in~ut

into the ..political process by the Commissioners'

failure to appoint
meaningful fa·s hion.

~lacks

to committees and boards in a

While the above is the moat blatant and

pervasive denial of access which plaintiffs established, the
court finds another more subtle denial of access caused in
. great part by past discrimination, and that is the proscription
of black ·participation in the personal contact politics of Burke
-26-
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County Whites.
The only enhancing factor that the Court considers has
a special bearing on the aggregate is the size of the district.
The County i s large and can reasonably be divided into districts.
But more importantly, the Court finds the size of the County,
in conjunction with the fact that its residents are not concentrated in the county seat, has an adverse effect on many of
the plaintiffs' access to the political process.
In the aggregate, defendants' unresponsiveness is per!'

petuating the effects of past discrimination against plaintiffs,
a group in a depressed socio-economic status, who have unfairly
been denied a role in the political destiny of Burke County.
Accordingly, the Court finds plaintiffs have shown a violation
of the rights guaranteed them by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.

It is unnecessary to consider the complaints of

violation of the First.and Thirteenth Amendments.
'•

IV.
RELIEF
In light of the Court's findings above, the Court orders,
for purposes of electing the five County Commissioners for
Burke County, that the County be divided into five districts
as delineated in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 300.
Although various districting proposals were submitted,
•
the Court finds plaintiffs' original plan to be superior to

..·

the others, including the similar plan submitted by defendants,
because the population deviation among the districts is substantially · less; i.e., 2.·3• as compared to 4' in the next best

-27-
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29
plan.
The Court selects a five-district plan over a plan in
which any member is elected at-large because no "special
circumstances" [Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108, 1111 (5th Cir.
1976)], could be found which would justify such an exception
in view of the testimony indicating

~he

Chair has little

added responsibility or authority in comparison 'to the other
Commissioners.
The Court ha s considered .defendants• request for a stay,
but under the

c i rc ~stances

denied that request.

There is.

ample time to ove r come any administrative problems.

The

plan selected by the Court tracks existing Militia District
lines to a great extent and should pose few problems in the
conduct of the election.
have the better of it.

Moreover, on balance, the plaintiffs
Further denial or postponement of

the Blacks' right to participate fully and freely in the
. so.ciety of Burke County is not ·properly justified.
'·

29
The following statistics show the breakdown of population
of the districts in' the plan selected by the Court as to race
and voting age and p~rcentage deviation by district:

District
1
2
3

4
5

District
1
2
3

4
·5

Total
.Population
3,736
. 3,673
3,595
3,590
3,661

•

Voting Age
Population
2,048
2,029
2,115
2,112
2,217

Black
White
Population (\) Population (\)
2,899
2,753
1,914
· 1,852
1,570

(77.6)
(74.9)
(53.2)
(51.6)
(42.9)

Black Voting Age
Population (\)
1,482
1,407
978
947
803

(72.4)
(69.3)
(46.2)
(44.6)

(36.2)
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837
920
1,681
1,738
2,091

.......-... , ..•.•.,...

(22.4)
(25.1)
(46.8)
(.48. 4)
(57.1)

'
Deviation
+2.-3
+0.5
-1.6
-1.7
+0.3

White Voting Age
Population (')
556

622
1,137
1,175
1,414

(27.6)
(30.7)
(53.8)
(55.4)
(63.8)

r

•

..

'

"

!• .

.I • ,. ,

.:r· ·

'

.: .

The foregoing findings and conclusions supplellel'\t the
Order heretofore entered by the Court directing the election
.
"
' for Burke tounty at the same time '
of the five Co~issione~a
1

as the general ~ election, Tueaday, November 8, 1978.

..

J. . CJ 0,

So Ordered, this
'•

~

day of October, 1978 •
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
\

I hereby certify that I have, prior to filing, served
copy of the foregoing Application for Stay upon Mr. David F . , .
Walbert, 1210 First National Bank Tower, Atlanta, Georgia 30303
and upon Mr. Robert W. Cullen, 322 Tenth Street, Augusta,
Georgia 30 ' 02 , Attorneys for Respondents, by mail, duly addressed
and • postag ~

p

paid •

.

..

Thi s October 30~ 1978 •

•

F

.·~
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

QUENTIN ROGERS, et al
Applicants

)
)
)

NO.

J~

'117

)

VS:
HERMAN LODGE, et al
Respondents

)
)
)
)
)

OCTOBER TERM, 1978

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ON
APPLICATION FOR STAY

Applicants hereby request the opportunity of
presenting oral argument on their application for stay.
This October 30, 1978.

P.

o.

Box 88

PRESTON B. LEWIS
LEWIS & LEWIS

Waynesboro, Georgia 30830

P. 0. Box 896

Elberton, Georgia 30635

HEARD, LEVERETT

&

ADAMS

ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANTS

RECEIVED

HOV i

1973

OFFICE OF' THE CL.ERv .
1
SUPR£M£ COURT,

U.s.'

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have, prior to filing, served
copy of the foregoing Request for Oral Argument on Application
for Stay upon Mr. David F. Walbert, 1210 First National Bank
Tower, Atlanta, Georgia

30303, and upon Mr. Robert W. Cullen,

322 Tenth Street, Augusta, Georgia

30902, Attorneys for

Respondents, by mail, duly addressed and postage prepaid.
This October 30, 1978.

(

RECEIVED
r~: C'/

3 1978

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1978.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

QUENTIN ROGERS, et al
Applicants
VS:
HERMAN LODGE, et al
Respondents

APRLICATION FOR .STAY
#A 417
C.A. #176-55-U.S. DISTRICT
COURT AND #78-3241
U.S. ·coURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF ON BEAALF OF APPLICANTS
IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION FOR STAY
Several factual statements in respondents' brief in opposition
require refutation.
Enhancing Factors.

At Page 5, respondents state that all four

enhanci_ng factors have been found to exist here.

This is not correct.

Burke County does not constitute · a large district, having only approximately 10,000 persons of voting
anti-single shot voting

~ge.

Nor does Georgia Law contain an

provision~

State Policies Favoring

County~Wide

Elections.

Also, at Page 5,

respondents state that the policies favoring county-wide elections arose
only after passage .of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and also were
designed to prevent blacks from -voting_.. There is no evidence

supporti~:~,..

this contention. County-wide voting has been in effect in Burke Count; 1\
.
.
.
•1.
as in many counties for many years. It is true that after Baker v. Carr~was ,•decided, a number of counties having district -type elections went
to co·unty.-wide voting, retaining the districts, however, for residency
purposes, i.n order to avoid problems attendant upon restructuring the
districts to comply with the one-man · one-vote principle.
-

Respondents'

.

statement that the adoption of county-wide voting during the 1960's
was for racially discriminatory purposes lacks evidence to support it.
Fear and Intimidation • . Respondents also state on Pages 5-6,
"Blacks were kept from the ballot through fear and intimidation, chicanery,
economic controls, the discriminatory use of the literacy test, and

~~

1

·--\~

.C

Georgiats 'question and answer• test, and by other means.

When the Voting

Rights Act was passed, the County Commission recommended eliminating all
the polling places in the County except one to thwart black voters.

Even

to this day, the County has taken every possible step to make registration
as difficult as possible for black residents."
There is no evidence whatever that fear or intimidation has ever been
exercised against black citizens in Burke County with respect to voting,
nor that chicanery, economic control, or discriminatory use of the literacy
test was ever

employed

in the County.

The only evidence on the use

of the literacy test was that it was administered 'iery fairly, and that
few blacks, not in excess of five percent of those taking it, were ever '
disqualified.

There was evidence that one County Commissioner at one time

proposed consolidating .Polling places, but there was no evidence whatever
that this was to thwart black voters.

The statement that the County has

taken every possible step to make registration as difficult as possible
for black

resi~ents·

is· completely without evidence, the evidence showing instead

that when the. plaintiff in this case requested additional registration places,
the County Commissioners provided them although the relatively small number
of people registering at the three new sites since their establ isnment
has raised serious doubt as to whether the registration sites were needed
in the first instance.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

P. 0. Box 88
Waynesboro, Georgia

30830

P. 0. Box 896
Elberton, Georgia 30635

PRESTON B. LEWIS
LEWIS & LEWIS

E. FREEMAN LEVERETT
HEARD, LEVERETT &ADAMS

ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANTS
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RECEIVED
Mn\f ,

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM 1978

•
NO.

4- VI!

QUENTIN ROGERS, - RAY DELAIGLE, ROBERT
L. WEBSTER, CHARLES H. KITCHENS, AND
THOMAS M. LOVETT, AS MEHBERS OF THE
BOARD OF COMHISSIONERS OF BURKE COUNTY,
GEORGIA, AND A. HOLLAND GNANN, OTTO B.
JOHNSON AND \.JALL T. THOMPSON, AS MEMBERS
OF THE BOARD OF ELECTIONS OF BURKE
· COUNTY, GEORGIA
APPLICANTS
-VERSUSHERMAN LODGE, SHELLEY COLEMAN, LIZZIE M. SAMS,
K. C. CHILDERS, REV. DAVID NELSON, TALMADGE
D. LODGE, WOODROW HARVEY AND LEVI CRANFORD
RESPONDENTS

APPLICATION FOR STAY NUMBER A417
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
TO APPLICATION FOR STAY

D~VID

1210 First National Bank Tower
Atlanta, Georeia 30303
(404)581-0403
322 Tenth Street
Augusta, Georgia
(404)828-2327

F. WALBERT

ROBERT W.

CL~LEN

30902

52 Fairlie Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
(404)523-2721

1978

LAUGHLIN McDONALD

ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS

I

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
TO APPLICATION FOR STAY
As the applicants point out, an order was entered in
this action calling for the elimination of the at-large
method of electing county commissioners in Burke County,
Georgia.

This order was supplemented by full findings of

fact and conclusions of law.

The clerk was directed to enter

a final judgment by order of the district judge on October 30,
1/
1978.The District Court denied applicants' motion for a
stay, and they then moved the Circuit for a stay.

After

submission of briefs by both parties and consideration of the
order of the District Court, a three-judge panel of the Fifth
Circuit also denied applicants' motion for a stay.

The defen-

dants are now in this Court seeking a stay, although this is
not the routine situation where a party is appealing or applying for certiorari to this Court, and seeking a stay at the
same time.

Instead, the order of the trial court will be

appealed directly to the Fifth Circuit for full consideration
there, prior to any possible application for certiorari here.

-

And it is extremely unlikely that this Court will ever hear
this case on the merits.

There is no issue here that would

merit granting certiorari -- applicants complain for the most
part of allegedly erroneous findings of fact by the trial
court -- and there is no right to an appeal to this Court in
this case.
In their application, petitioners completely ignore
the standards applicable in seeking the kind of extraordinary
relief they now ask for.

Even in the Court of Appeals, the

standard for granting this kind of a stay is a stringent one:

1/ Aoplicants ~rrongfully state that a stay is appropriate because final judgment was entered before full findings
of fact and conclusions of law. The original judgment was
entered without authority by a deputy clerk, and that judgment
was vacated by the District Court's order of October 30, 1978.

Unless an appellant can demonstrate
to the Court on such an emergency motion
as this that there is great likelihood,
approaching near certainty, that he will
prevail when his case finally comes to
be heard on the merits, he does not meet
the standard which all courts recognize
must be reached to warrant the entering
of an emergency order of this kind. Greene
v. Fair, 314 F.2d 200, 202 (5th Cir. 1963).
Of course, the standard for

t~e

present motion is even far more

stringent because of its particularly extraordinary nature.
Normally a single Justice will not intervene in a proceeding
that is still pending in a Court of Appeals in the absence of
the most compelling and unusual circumstances.

And it is

especially inappropriate to review a determination by the
Court of Appeals that a District Court's order should not be
stayed pending the appeal therefrom.

Four judges, including

the District Court judge who is most familiar with the facts
and the law of this case, have unanimously concluded that a
stay should not be granted.

Justice Harlan clearly expressed

the philosophy of this Court . in passing on the present type
of application for interim action when a case is actively
~

pending in a District Court.
(1960).

·~

O'Rourkev. Levine, 80 S.Ct. 623

Such action will be taken only "upon the weightiest

consideration,'' and where there

is "the most unequivocal

showing of a right" to such interim relief.

Even in cases that

are directly appealable to this Court from a district court,
stays are granted only in "unusual circumstances . "
Co.

v. United States, 75 S._!::t. 912 U955).

said there, single Justice's "stay powers .

Breswick &

As Justice Harlan
should be exer-

cised most sparingly, both in fairness to the prevailing parties
below and out of deference to the Court. A single Justice may
also be expected to give due regard to a lower court's denial
of a stay."

Those comments are particularly appropriate here,

where not only the District Court denied the stay, but where
the full panel of the Court of Appeals similarly considered
the application and denied it.

-2-
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Not only have the applicants completely failed to
establish, or even allege, any "great likelihood, approaching
near certainty" of success in their appeal, they do not even
present a slight possibility of prevailing.

This action is a

voting dilution case where the plaintiffs successfully provedtha
the maintenance of the at-large election system had the purpose
and effect of completely obliterating the power of their vote
contrary to the many holdings of this Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-

770 (1973); United States v. Board of Supervisors of Forrest
County, 571 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1978); Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d
209 (5th Cir. 1978); Thomasville Branch of the NAACP v. Thomas
County, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1978); Parnell v. Rapides Parish
School Board, 563 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1977); Kirksey v. Board of
Supervisors, 554 F. 2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 98
S.Ct. 512 (1977); Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976);
Wallace v. House, 538 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1976); Zimmer v.
McKeithen, 485 F.2d 12-97 (5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), aff'd sub
nom, East Carroll School Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976)

~

There was extensive live testimony and hundreds of documentary
exhibits presented to The Honorable Anthony A. Alaimo for his
consideration in arriving at a decision.

Of all the dilution

cases that have been before courts of the Fifth Circuit, the
evidence in this case of dilution far transcends that presented
in any other case.

In particular, the

plaintiff~

in this case

presented a great amount of- testiiDony and evidence concerning
the current racial practices of the defendants and the current
efforts of the defendants to keep blacks from entering the poli-

.

tical ·-p rocess on an eaual basis with the whites who have historically controlled the county.

In other cases, including the

Fifth Circuit's en bane decision in Kirksey v. Hinds County,
supra, voting dilution has been predicated fully on a showing of
past discrimination and the natural presumption of the continuing
effect that results from such past discrimination.
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As Judge

Clark stated in his opinion in the Forrest County case, a plaintiff may produce facts that are "concerned with the past" in
order to "demonstrate a history of dilution of access by blacks
to the political process," 571 F.2d at 955, and once that has
been done, it is the duty of the federal court to adopt a
reapportionment scheme that will "assure 'effective black
minority participation in demecracy. "' Id. at 955.
It is also interesting to note that the petitioners'
application for stay differs from their application in the
District Court and the Court of Appeals in one and only one
respect.

In those courts, the petitioners cried that the

holding of this election would create undue confusion . (even
though the timetable adopted by the District Court's order
fit

precisely within the timetable established by the Georgia

state law that governs special elections).

Now, plaintiffs make

no allegation of confusion, and the reason for that is quite
obvious.

A stay at this point would not minimize confusion,

but would instead cause unnecessary confusion.

Pursuant to the

Court's order, candidates began qualifying immediately, and
the period of qualification has been closed for over two weeks.
Candidates have been actively campaigning and everyone in the
county is prepared for an election to occur almost immediately.
Candida·t es have expended funds and presented their platforms
in an effort to seek office.

It would be a completely unjusti-

fied exercise of power for this Court to now step in, overrule
the other judges who have considered this problem, and enter an
order that would throw into confusion all the political expectations of candidates and electorate only hours before the
election itself is supposed to occur.

That should certainly not

be done where there is no opportunity to evaluate the evidence
presented in the case, and this Court is presented only with the
general allegations, gross hyperboles, and misrepresentations
that are presented in petitioners' application.
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Evidence of Dilution and Discrimination .

While the

defendants contend in their motion that the White v. Regester
and Zimmer

factors have not been proved in this case, that

contention is completely without merit.

Not only has every

single enhancing factor identified in any reported case been
found to exist here, there is also compelling proof of all the
so-called primary Zimmer factors.

The evidence presented in

this case is vastly greater than the evidence presented in the
White v. Regester decision which upheld the claim of dilution
in the at-large elections used in certain counties in the State
of Texas.
Although defendants represent that state policy
favors countywide elections, that is not true.

To the contrary,

plaintiffs shmved at trial that, to the extent there is a state
policy favoring at-large elections, it is specifically rooted
in racial discrimination.

This is shown by the many local

governments in Georgia that switched from district elections to
at-large elections shortly after the Voting Rights Act of 1965
was passed, the time when blacks were first allowed to vote
in most counties in the State of Georgia.

Moreover, it is

simply irrelevant what the state policy might be, since this
is a case involving federal constitutional and statutory
questions, and it is certainly somewhat late for the appellants
to contend that state laws are superior to federal statutes and
constitutional provisions once discrimination has been shown.
Defendants also make the extraordinary representation
in their motion that there has never been any discrimination
in the electoral and registration process.

To the contrary,

hardly any blacks were registered in Burke County before the
Congress intervened by exercising the full force of federal
power in the form of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Blacks

were kept from the ballot through fear and intimidation,
chicanery economic control, the discriminatory use of the
literacy test and Georgia's "question and answer" test, and
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by other means.

When the Voting Rights Act was passed, the

Cotmty Commission recommended eliminating all the polling
places in the county except one to thwart black voters.

Even

to this day, the county has taken every possible step to make
registration as difficult as possible for black residents.
The effect of these practices has been to continue the great
underrepresentation of blacks -on the voter registration books.
While the number of blacks of voting age in the county is
almost the same as the number of whites of voting age, only
38% of the registered voters in Burke County are black, while
2/
62% are white.On

t~e

issue of responsiveness, plaintiffs proved

that defendants had discriminated overwhelmingly against black
residents in employment, appointments to boards, municipal
services, voter registration, support of government-sponsored
projects within the county, and virtually every other activity
in which the county has participated in the past decade.

Yet,

defendants assert in their motion that the defendants have been
responsive to black interests.

To prevail on this point in

their appeal, the defendants have the burden of showing that
the trial court was "clearly erroneous" in concluding that the
petitioners have been unresponsive to black interests.

To pre-

vail on this application for stay, the petitioners would have
to do far more.

They have not done that, and in fact, this

is not even the time or place to hear appellants challenge a
District Court order claiming that the trial court's findings were
clearly erroneous .

That argument should be presented during

the regular course of an appeal to the Court of Appeals, not
to a single Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

2/ Registered voters, not population, are the
"barometer"" of dilution. Zimmer v. UcKeithen, supra.

-6-

Petitioners' Legal Objections.

Petitioners point out

that the City of Mobile decision is pending before the Supreme
Court at this time, and they feel that that is a sufficient
ground for a stay here.

But certainly the pendency of a voting

rights case before the Supreme Court cannot be the basis for
a stay, or stavs would be granted invariably since there is
nearly always one or more such cases pending before the Supreme
3/
Court.Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that any issue
presented in the Mobile appeal could affect the present case.
The Mobile case differs from all other dilution cases in one
and only one respect, and that is the fact that the specialized
city commission form of government was disestablished by the
district court, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit after full review, and a city council form of
government was put in its place in order to remedy the dilution
that had occurred.

Thus, there is a very substantial question

presented for the Supreme Court as to the limit on the
equitable power in a dilution case.

City of Mobile v. Bolden,

No. 77-1844, 4J U.S.L.W. 3190 (1978) (questions presented in

4/

certiorari petition).-

In this case, no modification in the actual form and
operation of the government will be effected in any way by the
District Court's order.

The sole change will be that the

county commissioners will be elected from the subdistricts within the county, rather than-from the county at large.

There can

be no question that this degree of relief is authorized in a
dilution case, since that is precisely what the United States
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed in its White v. Regester
3/ The Supreme Court has held that it is a gross abuse
of discretion, r.1arranting mandamus relief, to routinely stay
election orders because other election cases are pending in the
Supreme Court. Conner v. Coleman, 425 U.S. 675, 678-79 (1976).
4/ It is unlikely that this Court is concerned about
the "purpose or intent" issue, since it has already rejected
certiorari in the Fifth Circuit's en bane
- decision on that issue
in Kirksey v. Hinds County, supra.
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decision five years ago.
Secondly, defendants contend that their at-large
election system is insulated from a dilution attack because
it has been in effect for 67 years and was enacted at a time
when blacks were disenfranchised through other, cruder means
in Burke County.

This argument was rejected out of hand by

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Thomasville Branch of
the NAACP v. Thomas County, Georgia, 571 F.2d 257 (5th Cir.
1978).

The defendants' contention is also explicitly contrary

to the Supreme Court's decision in White v. Regester again,
since in that case, the multi-member district system invalidated
by the District Court had been in effect since the turn of the
century.

E.g., Vernon's Tex. Stat., 1914, Art. 26.

Similarly,

this Court struck down a Tennessee apportionment statute in
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), which had been in effect,
unchanged since 1901.

Clearly, in a voting case based on dilu-

tion and one-person/one-vote arguments, the date of the enactment of the

legislati~n

is

g~nerally insignifica~t.

If there

are intervening facts which cause the challenged apportionment
scheme to disc!iminate against certain groups, and particularly
where the discrimination is based on race, then the election
scheme is subject to challenge, and the federal courts have the
power to remedy the illegality.
Defendants also cite to the Supreme Court's recent
decision in wi·s e v. Lipscomb, 57 L.E.2d 411 (1978).

Wise

provides defendants no ground for appeal, however, much less a
certain ground. · Wise indicated that, in the circumstances of
that case. it would have been appropriate to allow local government an opportunity to reapportion itself after the declaration
5/
of unconstitutionality.Wise expressly recognized two exceptions, even under the facts of that case.

A district court

5/ The defendants complain they did not have an opportunity to present a plan, but the Court did request that the
parties present plans at the hearing. The defendants simply
failed to tender as to that request any plan that was remotely
acceptable under the rules of evidence, much less one that
comported with the Constitution.
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need not stay its hand where there are imminent elections, and
a district court need not stay its hand where the legislative
body fails to undertake reapportionment.

Both exceptions apply

here since elections were very "imminent" and were scheduled for
November.

The trial court's order calls for elections to be held

simultaneously with those regular elections.

The second excep-

tion is also applicable since the defendants have already
announced their intention not to pursue a legislative remedy.
In the trial court, their brief stated their ·intention to appeal
to the Court of Appeals and then to this Court.

The petitioners

admit that that process will require years, so the District
Court would obviously have to act, at the very latest, a year
from now in advance of the 1980 elections.

Under these cir-

cumstances, Wise certainly does not require the District Court
to blind itself to the admitted refusal of the defendants to
undertake voluntary reapportionment.
Moreover, Wise expressly omitted any discussion of
the significance of Section ·5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 since that issue had not been raised there.

In the present

case, the application of Section 5 is especially important and
again renders the dictum in Wise inapplicable.

For one thing,

Section 5 is a clear congressional finding and mandate to the
courts to ensure that voting-related remedies be adopted and
implemented with as much haste as possible in any jurisdiction
where Section 5 applies, as it does in Burke County.

Congress

imposed Section 5 restrictions only -in those areas where it
determined that resistance to equal voting rights was most
egregious.

The intention of Congress was to ensure rapid reme-

dies in voting litigation in any Section 5 covered area.

South

Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Moreover, Section 5 virtually precludes the voluntary solution suggested by Wise.

Any such effort by a state

legislature could be effected only upon federal approval under
Section 5.

The Wise test, whi.ch would have the District Court
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consider whether the proffered plan was constitutional, simply
cannot be applied in any jurisdiction where Section 5 is in
effect.
And finally, the petitioners' suggestion that Wise
will be the end of dilution cases for any state subdivision is
certainly erroneous.

The four Justices that commented in Wise

that there had not yet been a-definitive decision applying White
v. Regester to such political subdivisions certainly cannot be
translated into an opinion by the Court that there is no such
cause of action.

No case by any court, and certainly by this

Court, has ever held that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
do not apply to subdivisions of

a

state, and the four con-

curring Justices in the Wise case certainly do not state any
such opinion.

Petitioners seem to forget that a civil war

was fought in order to obtain the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments.

It is an extraordinary suggestion to

imply that this Court would ever effectively repeal those
amendments by holding ·that they did not apply to .elections for
subdivisions of a .state.

Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has
for political subdivisions
held that at-large elections/may be objected to under Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Allen v. State Board of

Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Perkins v. Hatthews, 400 U.S.
379 (1971).

But anything that can be challenged under Section

5 of that Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973c, can surely be challenged as
well under Section 2 of that Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973, since the
substantive language is essentially the same.
U.S.C. §1971.

See also, 42

The only difference is that the plaintiffs have

the burden of proof in a §1973 case, while the government has
the burden of proof in a Section 5 proceeding.
the plaintiffs have

rel~ed

In this case,

on the statutory provisions, as well

as the constitutional provisions.

Thus, even if a completely

unprecedented decision was rendered by the Supreme Court to the
effect that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments did not
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apply to local government, the plaintiffs here would still
prevail because of their statutory claims.

Cf. Nevett v. Sides,

571 F.2d 209, 213 n. 3, 237 (5th Cir. 1978).
Thus, the District Court's decision to require a
prompt remedy to the clearly unconstitutional election system
here is entirely in accordance with the decisions of the Fifth
Circuit, and it is most certainly in accordance with the
decisions of this Court.

In Parnell v. Rapides Parish School

Board, 563 F.2d 180, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1977), the Fifth Circuit held
that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court to
allow incumbents to hold office while awaiting far distant
elections.

In many other cases, the Court of Appeals has simi-

larly granted immediate and summary relief in voting discrimination cases.

Many of these cases are compiled by Judge Dawkins in

the Louisiana case of Wallace v. House, 377 F. Supp. 1192, 1201
(W.D.La. 1974), aff'd, 538 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1976).

The

Fifth Circuit and the District Courts of the Fifth Circuit
have far more knowledge than this Court, or a single Justice
acting in this Court, of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the egregious-voting discrimination that remains in the South
today.

Those Courts should be accorded a normal courtesy of

allowing them to pass on any arguments presented by the petitioners before intervention by this Court.

The arguments

raised by petitioners simply are not appropriately raised in
this Court.
Finally, repondents cannot fail to mention that
there are serious and substantial misrepresentations on many
grounds in the petitioners' motion.

Possibly the most egregious

is the shocking allegation that the parties and the Court have
"deliberately gerrymandered" a plan to dilute the white vote
and to guarantee election of certain individuals in the county.
Although the very plan adopted by the District Court was produced first well over a year ago, at no time prior to final
judgment in the trial court had there ever been a single
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objection to that plan by defendants.

Now, in this Court, and

without any shred of supporting evidence or testimony or even
insinuation in the trial court, petitioners' attorneys make
these completely improper accusations.

Misrepresentations and

arguments of this sort, particularly where there has been no
prior objection or supporting evidence tendered into the record,
are no basis for consideration -by this Court.
they are a firm basis for sanctions to be

tak~n

To the contrary,
against the

offending individuals, for members of the Bar should certainly
not be condoned when they make such malicious and unprofessional accusations, particularly where the sole purpose of
counsels' misrepresentations is to induce this Court to act
under a · misimpression and assist the defendants in perpetuating
the white supremacy that has continued to exist in Burke County,
Georgia, to the present date.
Petitioners make many other factual misrepresentations,
some of which are shorn of their substance simply by reviewing
the District Court's order.

Among these is the extraordinary

notion that blacks have been able to register and vote in
Burke County ''without difficulty" for at least the past 30 years.
That representation has no relation to the evidence actually
presented in this case.

As the District Court notes, blacks

were virtually a voting nonentity prior to federal intervention
in 1965 by way of the Voting Rights Act.

Defendants' own

witnesses admitted that the Georgi,a "question and answer" test
-- the very purpose of "t-Thich was indisputably to prevent blacks
from registering -- eliminated many, many prospective registrants.

Petitioners also failed to mention that public facili-

ties in Burke County are still segregated by race, 115 years
after the Civil War, and 14 years after passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.

They fail to mention that, according to the

very testimony of one of the defendant county commissioners
the county commissioners still refer to blacks as "niggers" in
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Burke County Commission meetings.

Defendants also fail to

refer to the days and days of other testimony as to the intense
racism that has characterized Burke County up to the present,
evidence of racism that makes all the testimony presented in
this Court's White v.

Reg~ster

decision pale by comparison.

In sum, there is no ground here that would conceivably
justify the extraordinary act1on requested.

Action by this

Court at this time would not only be unjustifiable under the
law and facts, it would cause great confusion in the orderly
election process of Burke County.

Nor can defendants possibly

complain that the election plan adopted by the District Court
is an improper one.

While petitioners state that blacks pre-

dominate in two districts, the percentages in the courtordered reapportionment plan are not particularly different
than in the plan tendered by defendants themselves.

It is

inconceivable how defendants can now challenge those very
numbers.
The true point of petitioners' application is probably
most clearly shown by their admission of the possibility that
this case will-be settled if county commissioners are elected
under an election plan that does in fact give blacks equal
access to the political system.

Since the at-large system

used completely excludes blacks from political input, there is
no possibility of settlement or fair treatment of the plaintiffs'
interests as long as the at-large system is maintained.

But

as defendants admit, election of county commissioners under a
fair district-based election system would substantially tend to
undercut the present control of the white supremacists in Burke
County, raising a realistic possibility of fair treatment of
the interests of black citizens, including settlement of this
suit and the adoption and continued use of a nondiscriminatory
election system.

The defendants' interest in a stay, · and their

very interest in an appeal at all, is solely and specifically
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to perpetuate the kind of white supremacy that has been the rule
of the Burke County Commission, and which can be remedied
solely by the kind of relief granted by the District Court.

Respectfully submitted,
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